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To avoid the appearance of sex discrimination that would violate Title VII of the Civil 
Rights Act, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) guidance coupled with a 
common misunderstanding of the law have resulted in little or no information about family 
status being provided in pre-employment interviews. To investigate whether concealing family 
information actually improves women’s employment prospects, we conducted an original 
experimental study fielded on more than 3000 subjects. Our study provides the first ever 
evidence that concealing personal information lowers female applicants’ hiring prospects. 
Subjects overwhelmingly preferred to hire candidates who provided personal or family 
information, regardless of content—any explanation improved employment prospects relative 
to no explanation for an otherwise identical job candidate. Our results are consistent with the 
behavioral economics theory of ambiguity aversion, which finds that individuals prefer known 
risks over unknown risks. These findings have broader implications regarding permissible pre-
employment questions, as they suggest that restrictions on questions about matters such as 
criminal history and credit history, both of which are currently targeted by legislatures and by 
the EEOC for prohibition, may likewise have adverse effects on the classes of workers such 
restrictions are intended to protect. Finally, our findings suggest that the interactive process 
model of reasonable accommodation, embodied in the enforcement guidance for the Americans 
with Disabilities Act, may provide a better model for accommodation of work–family balance. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 prohibits explicit employment 
discrimination on the basis of sex,1 but its efficacy in achieving gender 
equity in the workplace remains in doubt.2 Following Title VII’s passage, 
women made rapid progress in the workplace,3 yet by the 1990s, progress 
began to stall,4 and a seemingly intractable barrier to gender equity has 
 
1 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2012). 
2 The role of Title VII in reducing employment discrimination remains contested. For a critical 
assessment of the empirical literature examining whether Title VII succeeded in improving labor 
market outcomes for those in the protected classes, see generally Joni Hersch & Jennifer Bennett 
Shinall, Fifty Years Later: The Legacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 34 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 
424 (2015), which examines the legacy of the Civil Rights Act in terms of its impact on wage, 
employment, and segregation outcomes for its five protected classes. 
3 Women’s labor force participation grew rapidly in the second half of the 20th century, rising 
from 33.9% in 1950 and peaking at 60% in 1999. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T 
OF LABOR, CHANGES IN MEN’S AND WOMEN’S LABOR FORCE PARTICIPATION RATES (Jan. 10, 
2007), http://www.bls.gov/opub/ted/2007/jan/wk2/art03.htm [https://perma.cc/9647-TXCG]; see also Francine 
D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, The Gender Wage Gap: Extent, Trends, and Explanations 45 (IZA 
Discussion Paper No. 9656, 2016), http://ftp.iza.org/dp9656.pdf [https://perma.cc/ML9X-4FBF] 
(documenting “a decline in the unexplained gender wage gap”). See generally Claudia Goldin, The 
Quiet Revolution That Transformed Women’s Employment, Education, and Family, 96 AM. ECON. REV. 
1 (2006) (documenting the phases of women’s advancement in the labor market); Hersch & Shinall, 
supra note 2 (discussing the role of Title VII in women’s improved labor market prospects). 
4 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, WOMEN IN THE LABOR 
FORCE: A DATABOOK 1 (2015), http://www.bls.gov/opub/reports/womens-databook/archive/women
-in-the-labor-force-a-databook-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/TJB6-VK2T] (“Since [1999], labor force 
participation among women has declined, to 57.0 percent in 2014 . . . .”). These recent changes in 
labor force participation rates have been widely reported and analyzed. See, e.g., Chinhui Juhn & 
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remained: how to balance work and family.5 In light of the undeniable reality 
that men and women do not have equal procreative or childrearing roles,6 
work–family balance is universally perceived as a constraint on employment 
for women, but not for men.7 Mechanisms to achieve work–family balance, 
as a result, must take priority in any realization of workplace equality on the 
basis of sex. Laws intended to support work–family balance, such as the 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act8 and the Family and Medical Leave Act,9 
 
Simon Potter, Changes in Labor Force Participation in the United States, 20 J. ECON. PERSP., Summer 
2006, at 27 (reviewing the trends contributing to the drop in the labor force participation rate from 
2000 to 2005); Diane J. Macunovich, Reversals in the Patterns of Women’s Labor Supply in the United 
States, 1977–2009, 133 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Nov. 2010, at 16 (profiling the decline in women’s labor 
force participation in the first decade of the twenty-first century). 
5 For prior analyses of challenges of work–family balance, see generally MARY ANN MASON & EVE 
MASON EKMAN, MOTHERS ON THE FAST TRACK: HOW A NEW GENERATION CAN BALANCE FAMILY 
AND CAREERS (2007); KARINE MOE & DIANNA SHANDY, GLASS CEILINGS AND 100-HOUR COUPLES: 
WHAT THE OPT-OUT PHENOMENON CAN TEACH US ABOUT WORK AND FAMILY (2009); NAT’L 
WOMEN’S LAW CTR., 50 YEARS AND COUNTING: THE UNFINISHED BUSINESS OF ACHIEVING FAIR 
PAY (2013), https://nwlc.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/final_nwlc_equal_pay_report.pdf [https://perma.cc
/S2E2-4R7A] (analyzing the continuing barriers to fair pay for women and proposing state and federal policies 
to address these barriers); JOAN C. WILLIAMS, JESSICA MANVELL & STEPHANIE BORNSTEIN, “OPT OUT” 
OR PUSHED OUT?: HOW THE PRESS COVERS WORK/FAMILY CONFLICT (2006), http://www.work
lifelaw.org/pubs/OptOutPushedOut.pdf [https://perma.cc/PM29-P3F9] (analyzing how media publications 
reinforce the idea that women are increasingly choosing to leave work and offering a critique of that storyline). 
6 The current status of childbearing technology limits childbearing to women. Time use studies 
unambiguously demonstrate that even though fathers have increased their time involvement with childcare, 
mothers still spend far more time on childcare than fathers—even when both parents are employed full-time. 
Data on time use, categorized by parental status and sex, are available from the American Time Use Survey. 
See Press Release, Bureau of Labor Statistics, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Married Parents’ Use of Time, 2003–06 
(May 8, 2008), http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/atus2.pdf [https://perma.cc/8CF4-TY3W]. 
7 See generally Joni Hersch, Home Production and Wages: Evidence from the American Time Use 
Survey, 7 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 159 (2009) (showing a pay penalty for time spent on housework 
that is larger for women than for men); Joni Hersch & Leslie S. Stratton, Household Specialization and 
the Male Marriage Wage Premium, 54 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 78 (2000) (showing that married men 
earn more than otherwise comparable single men); Joni Hersch, Male-Female Differences in Hourly 
Wages: The Role of Human Capital, Working Conditions, and Housework, 44 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 746 
(1991) (demonstrating that home production adversely affects women’s earnings but not men’s); Joni 
Hersch, Sex Discrimination in the Labor Market, 2 FOUND. & TRENDS MICROECONOMICS 281 (2006) 
(describing economic models of household decisionmaking that lead women to specialize in home 
production and men to specialize in market work); Martha S. Hill, The Wage Effects of Marital Status 
and Children, 14 J. HUM. RESOURCES 579 (1979) (showing that marriage and fatherhood are associated 
with higher pay for men but not for women); Shelly Lundberg & Elaina Rose, Parenthood and the 
Earnings of Married Men and Women, 7 LAB. ECON. 689 (2000) (showing that women who exit the 
workforce for child-related reasons experience a pay penalty). 
8 The Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (2012) (expanding the meaning 
of sex within the statutory text of Title VII in order to prohibit discrimination on the basis of “pregnancy, 
childbirth, or related medical conditions”). 
9 The Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993, 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601 (2012), provides up to 
twelve weeks of unpaid leave for new mothers who are qualified employees working for qualified 
employers. To qualify as an employee under the FMLA, the employee must have worked for the 
employer for at least one year and at least 1250 hours. Id. § 2611(2)(A). To qualify as an employer, the 
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have proven inadequate as a means of equalizing opportunity in the 
employment relationship.10 
In the absence of any specific legislative guidance within the text of Title 
VII regarding how to equalize opportunity, Title VII’s sex discrimination 
provisions have spawned a series of information restrictions concerning the 
discussion of work–family matters. These restrictions largely derive from an 
overly broad reading—and, sometimes, a misreading—of Title VII case law by 
employers, employees, and even the Equal Employment Opportunity 
Commission (EEOC), the federal agency entrusted with enforcing the Act. To 
help employers navigate the issue of marital status inquiries during job 
interviews, the EEOC provides guidance such as the following: 
Questions about marital status and number and ages of children are frequently 
used to discriminate against women and may violate Title VII if used to deny 
or limit employment opportunities.  
It is clearly discriminatory to ask such questions only of women and not men (or 
vice-versa). Even if asked of both men and women, such questions may be seen 
as evidence of intent to discriminate against, for example, women with children.11 
This language warns employers that pre-employment questions about 
marital status and the number and ages of children risk violation of Title VII. 
Undoubtedly, this guidance is well-intentioned and instituted in recognition 
that these factors may be used to discriminate against hiring married women 
with children.12 However, law serves not only to establish order and protect 
 
employer must have at least fifty employees working for at least twenty weeks per year. Id. § 2611(4)(A). 
The Family and Medical Insurance Leave Act, a bill that would mandate paid maternity leave at the 
federal level, was introduced in both houses of Congress in 2013 and 2015; each time, however, the bills 
died in the House Ways and Means Committee and in the Senate Finance Committee. See Family and 
Medical Insurance Leave Act, H.R. 1439, 114th Cong. (2015), https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/
hr1439/BILLS-114hr1439ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HJQ-F5ST]; Family and Medical Insurance Leave 
Act of 2013, H.R. 3712, 113th Cong. (2013), https://www.congress.gov/113/bills/hr3712/BILLS-113hr3712
ih.pdf [https://perma.cc/FS7U-UVTD]. 
10 See, e.g., Charles L. Baum II, The Effect of State Maternity Leave Legislation and the 1993 Family 
and Medical Leave Act on Employment and Wages, 10 LAB. ECON. 573, 591 (2003) (demonstrating that 
the FMLA did not increase women’s employment or wages); Christopher J. Ruhm, Policy Watch: 
The Family and Medical Leave Act, 11 J. ECON. PERSP. 175, 184-85 (1997) (arguing that the FMLA 
has provided relatively few benefits to employees); Jane Waldfogel, The Impact of the Family and 
Medical Leave Act, 18 J. POL’Y ANALYSIS & MGMT. 281, 299-300 (1999) (finding that neither 
women’s employment or wages improved after the FMLA). 
11 Pre-Employment Inquiries and Marital Status or Number of Children, U.S. EQUAL EMP. 
OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/laws/practices/inquiries_marital_status.cfm [https://pe
rma.cc/6FEZ-FT6B] [hereinafter PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES GUIDANCE]. 
12 See, e.g., Jenny Che, 10 Questions Employers Can’t Ask You in a Job Interview, HUFFINGTON POST 
(Apr. 9, 2015, 4:19 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/09/off-limits-questions-job-interviews_n_7
028050.html [https://perma.cc/TA7D-M574] (“Here are the questions interviewers should never ask but 
sometimes do anyway: . . . Are you married? . . . Do you have children or plan to?”); Louise Kursmark, 
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rights, but also to promulgate norms.13 Current interpretations of Title VII 
send the message that family life and work life are to remain separate. In 
contrast, consider many other topics that may naturally arise in the pre-
employment setting—athletic pursuits, travel, and hobbies.14 Discussion of 
such topics helps employers and applicants understand whether there is a fit 
with the workplace culture.15 
 
Keep the Interview Legal, MONSTER (2016), http://hiring.monster.com/hr/hr-best-practices/recruiting-hir
ing-advice/interviewing-candidates/legal-job-interview-questions.aspx [https://perma.cc/ZD73-SWQ4] 
(“Questions about marital status and family issues are discouraged except as they relate to job 
performance.”); Illegal Interview Questions and Female Applicants, FINDLAW (2016), http://employment.find
law.com/hiring-process/illegal-interview-questions-and-female-applicants.html#sthash.tRHlEV7C.dpuf 
[https://perma.cc/ZF6T-EPQS] (“Despite warnings to the contrary, some employers ask inappropriate 
questions during the job interview process that border on illegality including questions about a female 
applicant’s family life, marital status, and child rearing plans.”). 
13 The role of law in promulgating norms is known as the expressive function of law and is the 
subject of a rich literature by leading legal scholars including Richard McAdams, Lynn Stout, Robert 
D. Cooter, and Cass R. Sunstein. See generally RICHARD MCADAMS, THE EXPRESSIVE POWERS OF 
LAW: THEORIES AND LIMITS (2015); LYNN STOUT, CULTIVATING CONSCIENCE: HOW GOOD 
LAWS MAKE GOOD PEOPLE (2011); Robert D. Cooter, Expressive Law and Economics, 27 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 585 (1998); Richard H. McAdams, A Focal Point Theory of Expressive Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1649 
(2000); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2021 (1996). For a work 
examining the mutual influence of extrinsic and intrinsic motivation on the expressive attempts of the 
law “to inform and educate the public as to what is socially and morally desirable,” see Yuval Feldman, 
The Complexity of Disentangling Intrinsic and Extrinsic Compliance Motivations: Theoretical and Empirical 
Insights from the Behavioral Analysis of Law, 35 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 11, 16 (2011). 
14 See, e.g., Ashley Faus, 4 Things You Didn’t Know You Could Put on Your Resume, MUSE (Feb. 2, 2012, 
10:22 AM), https://www.themuse.com/advice/4-things-you-didnt-know-you-could-put-on-your-resume 
[https://perma.cc/TU6D-7JSD] (suggesting that volunteer work, professionally-relevant hobbies, non-
professional experiences, and interests contribute to a “compelling, well-rounded, and interesting” 
résumé); Gabriela Gardoş, What to Do with Those Extracurricular Activities on Your CV, GRADUATELAND 
(Oct. 6, 2015), http://graduateland.com/article/how-to-integrate-extracurriculars-in-your-CV [https://
perma.cc/AT2E-CAWN] (“[A]n interesting activity may make it easier for you to stand out to an 
employer.”); Rachel Gillett, Here Are the Personal Interview Questions One CEO Asks During Every Job 
Interview, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2016, 11:12 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/personal-interview-
questions-one-ceo-always-asks-2016-1 [https://perma.cc/5GGA-MWEB] (describing how one CEO asks 
job candidates about the books or magazines they are reading and what candidates do in their spare time). 
15 See Daniel M. Cable & Timothy A. Judge, Interviewers’ Perceptions of Person–Organization Fit 
and Organizational Selection Decisions, 82 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 546, 555 (1997) (concluding that 
“interviewers base their [person–organization] fit evaluations on the congruence between their 
perceptions of applicants’ values and their organizations’ values”); Bradford Cornell & Ivo Welch, 
Culture, Information, and Screening Discrimination, 104 J. POL. ECON. 542, 562 (1996) (demonstrating 
that “the hiring decision is influenced not only by the similarity of the applicant’s and the 
interviewer’s race, sex, or other minority status but also by the similarity of their general 
background”); Lauren A. Rivera, Hiring as Cultural Matching: The Case of Elite Professional Service 
Firms, 77 AM. SOC. REV. 999, 1017 (2012) (arguing that hiring is “a process of cultural matching 
between candidates, evaluators, and firms”); Manuel F. Bagues & María José Pérez Villadóniga, Why 
Do I Like People Like Me? 3 (Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, Working Paper No. 08-06, 2008) 
(showing that employers “tend to give a higher valuation to the candidate who excels in the same 
dimensions as [the employer] does”). 
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Notably, although employers are prohibited from asking questions about 
marital status and children in a way that violates Title VII, applicants are in no 
way prohibited from volunteering such information. Yet, job candidates refrain 
from doing so. Indeed, it is so widely understood that pre-employment inquiries 
about family matters are prohibited that applicants may reasonably assume that 
they too are forbidden from volunteering such personal information and that 
doing so would undermine their employment prospects. Job applicants’ fear of 
volunteering information about family matters is further compounded by the 
popular career advice that also discourages such volunteering.16 
The processes by which job applicants reach an understanding that family 
matters are off limits in the workplace derive from two related sources. First, 
drawing on theories of the expressive value of law, the promulgation of such 
laws and EEOC guidance informs the public that such questions are 
discriminatory. A second source derives from the tendency of people to imitate 
others in deciding whether to obey the law,17 often without knowledge of the 
actual legality of the imitated action by the party being imitated.18 Our 
situation is conceptually similar in that job applicants and employees are not 
prohibited from discussing family matters, but the restriction on employers to 
ask about the topic sends a message that such conversations are off limits, and 
indeed prohibited, in the employment setting. The practical result of the 
workplace information restrictions on employers and employees—restrictions 
that hazily trace their roots to Title VII—is a widespread fear engendered in 
both employers and employees of discussing family matters in the workplace. 
In this Article, we examine the consequences of these workplace information 
restrictions and argue that a new approach is needed to achieve workplace equity. 
Specifically, we present findings from an original experimental study designed 
to identify whether providing information about family matters, as opposed to 
concealing this information, influences hiring decisions. Our experimental 
 
16 See, e.g., Kristin Colella, 7 Tips for Stay-at-Home-Moms Returning to Work, MAINSTREET (May 9, 
2014, 7:56 AM), https://www.mainstreet.com/article/7-tips-stay-home-moms-returning-work/page/4 
[https://perma.cc/RF2P-LWA2] (advising applicants not to discuss parenting and housekeeping skills); Tips 
for Moms Returning to the Work Force, ABC NEWS (Aug. 6, 2003), http://abcnews.go.com/GMA/story?id=124
887&page=1 [https://perma.cc/ERR6-6DHE] (“Avoid talking about your children and your family.”). 
17 A substantial literature documents that imitation is widespread over numerous situations. 
See, e.g., Nicholas A. Christakis & James H. Fowler, The Spread of Obesity in a Large Social Network 
over 32 Years, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. 370, 375-77 (2007) (showing that weight gain spreads via social 
networks); C. Scott Hemphill & Jeannie Suk, The Law, Culture, and Economics of Fashion, 61 STAN. 
L. REV. 1147, 1184-95 (2009) (discussing the interplay of imitative behavior and intellectual property 
law in the fashion market); W. Kip Viscusi et al., Private Recycling Values, Social Norms, and Legal 
Rules, 124 REVUE D’ECONOMIE POLITIQUE 159, 169-71 (2014) (demonstrating that recycling laws 
influence social recycling norms). 
18 See Bert Huang, Shallow Signals, 126 HARV. L. REV. 2227, 2227 (2013) (“Seeing others act 
illegally, we gather that a rule is weakly enforced or that its penalty is not serious. But we may be 
imitating by mistake: what others are doing might not be illegal – for them.”). 
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design is based on the realistic and statistically valid observation that many 
women leave the workforce for family reasons,19 yet wish to reenter the 
workforce after a period of time.20 This exit-and-reentry situation provides a 
plausible framework, given the current legal environment, for examining the 
role of information about family matters in hiring decisions. Fielded on over 
3000 subjects, our study provides evidence—perhaps the first of its kind—that 
workplace information restrictions may actually serve to stifle, rather than 
improve, workplace equity. More specifically, our study finds that otherwise 
identical applicants with a substantial gap in their work history who do not 
explain the personal family circumstances surrounding their job search are far 
less likely to be hired than those who do. Furthermore, the content of the reason 
provided for the job search does not matter; any explanation improves 
employment prospects relative to no explanation. 
Though perhaps counterintuitive, in fact, behavioral economics theory 
predicts our findings. According to the behavioral tendency known as 
“ambiguity aversion” or the “Ellsberg Paradox,” named after Daniel Ellsberg, 
the economist who first posited the theory,21 individuals prefer known risks 
over unknown risks, for any given level of risk.22 Although ambiguity aversion 
is regarded as a form of economically irrational behavior, it is a widespread 
 
19 See Sharon R. Cohany & Emy Sok, Trends in Labor Force Participation of Married Mothers of Infants, 
130 MONTHLY LAB. REV., Feb. 2007, at 9, 10-12 (showing lower labor force participation rates among 
married women with young children); D’VERA COHN ET AL., PEW RES. CTR., AFTER DECADES OF 
DECLINE, A RISE IN STAY-AT-HOME MOTHERS 5 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/files/
2014/04/Moms-At-Home_04-08-2014.pdf [https://perma.cc/V8HP-PXSC] (documenting that in 2012, 
29% of mothers stayed at home with their children). 
20 See generally MASON & EKMAN, supra note 5 (discussing strategies for professional women 
seeking to reenter the workforce after exiting for family reasons); Sylvia Ann Hewlett & Carolyn Buck 
Luce, Off-ramps and On-ramps: Keeping Talented Women on the Road to Success, 83 HARV. BUS. REV. 43, 
46-47 (2005) (discussing the common penalties for women who leave the workforce and later wish to 
return). News coverage on the prevalence of professional women who exited the workforce for family 
reasons and seek to reenter is extensive. See, e.g., Jennifer Preston, Back in the Game, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 
18, 2014, at F1. Universities, career counseling firms, and major employers have established programs 
targeted at professional women seeking to reenter the workforce. See, e.g., New Directions for Attorneys, 
ELISABETH HAUB SCH. OF L., http://law.pace.edu/newdirections [https://perma.cc/W8XQ-G27U] 
(giving an example of a university-based program); IRELAUNCH: THE RETURN TO WORK EXPERTS, 
http://www.irelaunch.com [https://perma.cc/U7WQ-QCRF] (providing an example of a program 
offered through a career counseling firm); Return to Work, MORGAN STANLEY, http://
www.morganstanley.com/people-opportunities/return-to-work.html [https://perma.cc/7ZVN-B8PG] 
(giving an example of a program offered through a major private employer). 
21 See generally Daniel Ellsberg, Risk, Ambiguity, and the Savage Axioms, 75 Q. J. ECON. 643 (1961). 
22 Id. at 657 (finding that individuals differentiated between uncertainties based on “the nature 
of one’s information concerning the relative likelihood of events. . . , a quality depending on the 
amount, type, reliability and ‘unanimity’ of information, and giving rise to one’s degree of 
‘confidence’ in an estimate of relative likelihoods”). 
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behavioral phenomenon.23 In the hiring context we examined, we found that 
subjects preferred to hire the candidate who provided information about family 
characteristics over the uncertain alternative who offered no such information. 
The experiment is structured so that the additional information provided is not 
informative as to the probability that the candidate will be productive; only the 
ambiguity of the employers’ beliefs is affected.  
Although the number of stay-at-home fathers has increased since the 2008 
recession, the number still remains quite small compared to the number of 
stay-at-home mothers.24 The burdens associated with childcare and home 
production still largely fall on women, as even today, only one in five fathers with 
preschool-aged children assume primary caregiving responsibility.25 The result 
for employers is that, in contrast to the situation for women, little additional 
information is provided by discussing men’s parental status, so the role of 
ambiguity with respect to family status is less of an issue when hiring men.26 
Consequently, we argue that the EEOC guidance discouraging pre-employment 
questions about family matters has outlived its value—to the extent it ever 
provided value. Our argument stands in contrast to the positions of several 
employment discrimination scholars who have recently advocated for increasing 
blanket family-status protections in the workplace.27 While their intentions are 
 
23 See generally Mark J. Machina & Marciano Siniscalchi, Ambiguity and Ambiguity Aversion 
(surveying numerous experiments demonstrating ambiguity aversion), in 1 HANDBOOK OF THE 
ECONOMICS OF RISK AND UNCERTAINTY 729 (Mark J. Machina & W. Kip Viscusi eds., 2014). 
24 Compare Gretchen Livingston, Growing Number of Dads Home with the Kids, PEW RES. CTR. 
1 (2014), http://www.pewsocialtrends.org/2014/06/05/growing-number-of-dads-home-with-the-kids 
[https://perma.cc/WTR3-7HS9] (finding two million stay-at-home fathers in 2012), with COHN ET 
AL., supra note 19, at 6 (finding 10.4 million stay-at-home mothers in 2012). 
25 Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, One-Third of Fathers with Working Wives Regularly Care 
for Their Children (Dec. 5, 2011), https://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/children/cb11-
198.html [https://perma.cc/6BW9-GEDW]. 
26 See Shelley J. Correll et al., Getting a Job: Is There a Motherhood Penalty?, 112 AM. J. SOC. 1297, 
1317 (2007) (finding employment discrimination against mothers, but not fathers); Rebecca Glauber, Race 
and Gender in Families and at Work: The Fatherhood Wage Premium, 22 GENDER & SOC’Y 8, 17 (2008) 
(documenting differences in parental wage premiums for fathers of different races and ethnicities). 
27 See, e.g., Rachel Arnow-Richman, Incenting Flexibility: The Relationship Between Public Law 
and Voluntary Action in Enhancing Work/Life Balance, 42 CONN. L. REV. 1081, 1086-87 n.13 (2010) 
(characterizing the EEOC caretaker guidance as a “[k]ey development[] in achieving greater 
inclusion and equal treatment of working caregivers”); Noreen Farrell & Genevieve Guertin, Old 
Problem, New Tactic: Making the Case for Legislation to Combat Employment Discrimination Based on 
Family Caregiver Status, 59 HASTINGS L.J. 1463, 1465-66 (2008) (arguing for new federal legislation 
that prohibits “family responsibilities discrimination”); Sharona Hoffman, The Importance of 
Immutability in Employment Discrimination Law, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1483, 1533-36 (2011) 
(labeling parental status and marital status as “puzzling exclusions” from current federal 
antidiscrimination laws); Joan C. Williams & Stephanie Bornstein, The Evolution of “FReD”: Family 
Responsibilities Discrimination and Developments in the Law of Stereotyping and Implicit Bias, 59 
HASTINGS L.J. 1311, 1315 (2008) (characterizing the EEOC Title VII caretaker guidance as “the 
single most important recent development in the field” of family responsibilities discrimination). 
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admirable, these scholars, we believe, have failed to consider the practical 
ramifications of blanket family-status protections in the workplace for mothers 
seeking a family-friendly career. At the time of passage of the 1964 Civil Rights 
Act, in the absence of out-of-home childcare,28 employment of mothers of young 
children was rare.29 Now it is entirely the norm.30 No longer is the question 
whether a mother will work, but instead what jobs provide a match that allows 
work–family balance. The practical result of the EEOC guidance—or any policy 
that discourages an honest discussion of family matters between employees and 
employers in today’s workplace—is that it suppresses information, which 
disparately harms women’s employment prospects. 
Our employment experiment creates a realistic context to examine the 
importance of laws that result in the suppression of information with 
implications that may extend to the role of information exchange in the legal 
context more generally. To our knowledge, we are the first to examine the 
influence of ambiguity aversion in the context of employment law. Although 
our focus in this Article is on the consequences of workplace information 
restrictions on gender equity in the workplace, the significance of workplace 
information restrictions is far broader and is relevant not only to women, but 
to all historically underserved groups protected by employment discrimination 
laws. For example, two widely advocated proposals to increase workplace equity 
for disadvantaged groups include restrictions on criminal background checks31 
and credit history checks32 by employers. Such proposals are simply another 
 
28 See Elizabeth U. Cascio & Diane Whitmore Schanzenbach, The Impacts of Expanding Access 
to High-Quality Preschool Education, 2013 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 127, 139-45 
(discussing historic expansions in early childcare). 
29 See Facts over Time, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: WOMEN’S BUREAU (2016), http://www.dol.gov/
wb/stats/facts_over_time.htm#labor [https://perma.cc/DCQ5-JRCV] (revealing low labor market 
participation rates of mothers in the 1970s); cf. CLAUDIA GOLDIN, UNDERSTANDING THE GENDER 
GAP: AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN 125 (1990) (“Women who desire careers 
might reduce their fertility or have children later in life.”). 
30 See Mothers and Families: Labor Force Participation, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR: WOMEN’S BUREAU 
(2016), http://www.dol.gov/wb/stats/mother_families.htm [https://perma.cc/Q3C8-UTYT] (documenting a 
69.9% labor participation rate for mothers with children under the age of eighteen). 
31 For a discussion of laws that limit employers’ ability to consider criminal history, see Hersch & 
Shinall, supra note 2, at 450, noting that “the rise in state and local ban-the-box laws, as well as private 
compliance . . . suggests that society is moving in the direction of considering criminal background checks 
as a form of employment discrimination.” See also U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 
915.002, CONSIDERATION OF ARREST AND CONVICTION RECORDS IN EMPLOYMENT DECISIONS 
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964 (2012), https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/guidance/
arrest_conviction.cfm [https://perma.cc/R9RA-RM52]; NAT’L EMP’T LAW PROJECT, “BAN THE BOX” IS 
A FAIR CHANCE FOR WORKERS WITH RECORDS (2016), http://www.nelp.org/content/uploads/Ban-the-
Box-Fair-Chance-Fact-Sheet.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2F2-K43W] (discussing the success and proliferation 
of ban-the-box laws and fair-chance policies throughout the United States). 
32 See, e.g., N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODE § 8-107 (2016) (“[I]t shall be an unlawful discriminatory 
practice for an employer, labor organization, employment agency, or agent thereof to request or to 
use for employment purposes the consumer credit history of an applicant for employment or 
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form of workplace information restrictions. As a result, the evidence 
presented in this Article suggests that these restrictions may likewise have 
adverse consequences on their intended beneficiaries. 
In making the argument against such information restrictions in 
employment, this Article proceeds as follows: Part I highlights the familiar 
scenario of a worker who regularly confronts the information restrictions that 
motivate our experimental study—a mother who exited the labor force to care 
for her children and now wishes to reenter the workplace. This example, not 
coincidentally, also forms the basis for our experimental study. Part II 
discusses the evolution of the case law and current EEOC guidance on 
permissible interview questions—particularly as they relate to reentering 
stay-at-home mothers—while Part III explains the behavioral economics 
theory of ambiguity aversion in the context of the ambiguity created by this 
EEOC guidance. Part IV places our experimental study in the context of 
prior work on hiring discrimination in economics scholarship and prior 
experimental work in legal scholarship. Part V details our experimental 
design, and Parts VI and VII explore our findings and their implications for 
the current workplace norm against requesting or volunteering information 
regarding family matters. 
I. INFORMATION RESTRICTIONS AT WORK: THE EXAMPLE  
OF STAY-AT-HOME MOTHERS 
Even though workplace information restrictions may impact job applicants 
and employees of many backgrounds, these restrictions are perhaps most visible 
and most pervasive as they relate to women in the workplace. Imagine, for 
example, the case of Amy, an associate at a large law firm.33 After the birth of her 
first child, Amy initially plans to return to work, but later changes her mind due 
to the short duration of her maternity leave. The next several years bring two 
additional children and multiple geographic moves to accommodate her husband’s 
career, and before she knows it, Amy has been out of the labor force for ten years. 
And yet, Amy is not satisfied to remain a homemaker for the rest of her days; 
instead, now that her children are school-aged and her husband’s career is more 
settled in one location, Amy wants to go back to the practice of law. 
 
employee, or otherwise discriminate against an applicant or employee with regard to hiring, 
compensation, or the terms, conditions or privileges of employment based on the consumer credit 
history of the applicant or employee.”). 
33 This example is loosely based on the story of Amy Beckett, whose struggle to return to work 
after a career break was documented by Katherine Reynolds Lewis in The Return: A Stay-at-Home 
Mom Attempts to Go Back to Work After Nearly Two Decades. Can She Revive Her Career?, WASH. POST 
(Apr. 4, 2010), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/29/AR2010032902
620.html [https://perma.cc/4QGL-JYWT]. 
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Like Amy’s decision to stay at home with her children, similar decisions 
made by other American mothers to exit the workforce may be motivated by 
a number of factors, including a desire to be present during their children’s 
formative years, the high cost of childcare, and the lack of federally mandated 
paid family leave.34 The choice to become a stay-at-home mother upon the 
birth or adoption of a child is extremely common—approximately 30% of 
women with children do not work outside the home—thus, our experimental 
design reflects a common situation.35 But stay-at-home mothers do not 
necessarily view their decision to leave the labor market as permanent; they often 
view their decision as a career break, rather than a career exit. 
For the many mothers like Amy who eventually desire to end their career 
break—perhaps because their children have gone to school, or perhaps because 
their financial situation has changed—the road to labor market reentry is uphill 
and fraught with uncertainty. During their absence, their former industry may 
have changed, their skills may have become outdated, and their business 
connections may have dwindled.36 Yet even the stay-at-home mothers who have 
avoided these common labor market reentry issues and are ready to jump back 
into the workforce must confront one unavoidable problem: no matter how 
impressive their credentials were at the time they left the workforce, their 
résumés will indicate a gap in their employment history. 
As a result, numerous websites37 and articles38 are devoted to advising 
stay-at-home mothers such as Amy on how to effectively reenter the labor 
market. Instead of being forthcoming with employers, reentering mothers 
typically are advised to mask employment gaps in their résumés through 
 
34 See 29 U.S.C. § 2611(2)(A) (2012); id. § 2612(c) (providing unpaid family leave). 
35 See COHN ET AL., supra note 19, at 5 (reporting that the share of mothers who did not work 
outside of the home was 29% in 2012); see also Julie L. Hotchkiss, M. Melinda Pitts & Mary Beth 
Walker, Labor Force Exit Decisions of New Mothers, 9 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 397, 412 (2011) 
(demonstrating that “declining labor market exit rates among women upon the birth of a child made 
an about-face in the late 1990s and started to rise”); The Return of the Stay-at-Home-Mother, 
ECONOMIST 2 (Apr. 19, 2014), http://www.economist.com/news/united-states/21600998-after-falling-
years-proportion-mums-who-stay-home-rising-return [https://perma.cc/WDN5-NF24] (reporting the 
share of mothers who did not work outside the home was 23% in 2000). 
36 See, e.g., Hewlett & Luce, supra note 20, at 46-49 (discussing the “penalties” and pitfalls 
encountered by women who take time out of the labor market to care for children). 
37 See, e.g., CORPS TEAM, http://www.corpsteam.com [https://perma.cc/ZY9M-83RX]; IRELAUNCH, 
supra note 20; JOBS AND MOMS, http://www.jobsandmoms.com [https://perma.cc/8NZ3-GUMX]. 
38 See, e.g., Sharon Reed Abboud, Interview Tips for Stay-at-Home Moms Reentering Today’s Job Market, 
MONSTER (2016), http://career-advice.monster.com/job-interview/interview-preparation/all-moms-work
-confidence-interview/article.aspx [https://perma.cc/9XWJ-ZHGD]; Susan Adams, Seven Keys to Rejoining 
the Workforce After a Long Break, FORBES (Nov. 17, 2014, 9:50 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/susanadams
/2014/11/17/seven-keys-to-rejoining-the-workforce-after-a-long-break/#423dc54c74ca [https://perma.cc/LV
L4-ADSK]; Lindsay Olson, 6 Tips for Re-Entering the Workforce, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (Oct. 2, 2014, 
10:37 AM), http://money.usnews.com/money/blogs/outside-voices-careers/2014/10/02/6-tips-re-entering-
the-workforce [https://perma.cc/MU46-EG32]. 
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strategies such as removing dates from their work history, listing freelance 
and self-employment projects, and listing volunteer work as employment.39 
Amy followed this popular advice in her own career search, listing her 
volunteer experience at her children’s school on her résumé. But months of 
searching and sending out résumés failed to give rise to a full-time job offer, 
and Amy’s only option, if she wanted to take a job, was to accept occasional 
part-time legal contract work. 
Amy’s experience, which is based on the true story of Amy Beckett, a lawyer 
profiled by the Washington Post in 2010,40 raises several questions: Are 
reentering mothers receiving the right career advice? And why should 
applicants like Amy be reluctant to volunteer that their employment gaps arose 
from a parenting choice? In part, of course, is concern over stigma associated 
with failing to conform to the male norm of the dedicated worker who 
prioritizes work over family. Still, the employment gap is there, and it is real. 
Failing to acknowledge and explain this gap may only raise questions that it 
materialized from decisions and behaviors even less associated with labor 
market success, such as lack of financial or intrinsic motivation for 
employment,41 incarceration, mental illness, or substance abuse. 
Of course, in the absence of an applicant volunteering information, 
employers viewing a résumé like Amy’s could instead directly ask about a gap in 
employment history. But such a question, employers may fear, could be viewed 
as an implicit question about marital status and children, which is strongly 
discouraged by the EEOC guidance.42 Indeed, as noted in the Introduction, the 
agency suggests that any such inquiry may be used as “evidence of intent to 
discriminate” in violation of Title VII.43 The conscientious employer will thus 
refrain from asking anything that might lead to a mention of family matters, and 
as a result, remain ignorant about the reasons underlying an applicant’s résumé 
gap. And, in the absence of any concrete information, the employer is left to 
guess whether the gap resulted from simply staying home with children, or from 
something potentially of concern. 
 
39 See, e.g., Kim Isaacs, Resume Tips for Full-Time Parents Returning to Work, MONSTER (2016), 
http://career-advice.monster.com/resumes-cover-letters/resume-writing-tips/resume-tips-parents-returning-
to-work/article.aspx [https://perma.cc/WJT4-MYQZ] (recommending that stay-at-home parents create a 
“functional resume” that emphasizes skills, while “downplaying . . . employment history”). 
40 See Lewis, supra note 33. 
41 In the employment context, intrinsic motivation refers to an individual’s desire to do a job for 
its own sake, in contrast to extrinsic motivation, which is based on rewards for performance. See, e.g., 
Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation, 15 INT’L J. INDUS. 
ORG. 427, 428-30 (1997) (describing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation in the employment setting). 
See generally David M. Kreps, Intrinsic Motivation and Extrinsic Incentives, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 359 
(1997) (discussing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation); Edward P. Lazear, Personnel Economics: Past 
Lessons and Future Directions, 17 J. LAB. ECON. 199 (1999). 
42 See PRE-EMPLOYMENT INQUIRIES GUIDANCE, supra note 11. 
43 Id. 
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As seen in Amy’s case, leaving an employer to guess the reason for an 
employment gap may not end well for a job applicant, such that even highly 
qualified candidates may have to scramble to find work upon reentry. In the case 
of a mother like Amy, the potential for the unintended consequences of 
information restrictions derived from employment discrimination law is clear. 
The experimental work detailed in Parts V and VI is intended to evaluate both 
the magnitude of these consequences and whether they outweigh the benefits 
provided by such restrictions—in other words, to assess whether the story of Amy 
is the exception or the rule. Before turning to the experimental work, we first 
pause to trace the history of these Title VII–based information restrictions, 
which, despite their inclusion in the EEOC guidance, are not grounded in the 
plain language of the statute. Understanding the motivations behind these 
restrictions, and their potential benefits, requires understanding the source. 
II. THE ROAD TO IMPERMISSIBILITY FOR FAMILY-STATUS INQUIRIES 
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits employers from “fail[ing] or 
refus[ing] to hire or . . . discharg[ing] any individual, or otherwise . . . discriminat[ing] 
against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or 
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, 
or national origin.”44 The Act does not contain any text about marital status, 
parental status, or family status. Thus, a plain language reading of the statute 
might suggest that employers are perfectly within their legal rights to ask 
questions about family matters during job interviews. In contrast, the EEOC 
best practices guidance on Title VII advises employers, “Do not ask questions 
about the applicant’s or employee’s children, plans to start a family, 
pregnancy, or other caregiving-related issues during interviews or 
performance reviews.”45 The juxtaposition of the EEOC guidance with the 
total absence of family-status language in the actual text of Title VII raises 
two related questions: How did the EEOC decide that family-status inquiries 
run afoul of Title VII? And how did such a strong norm against such inquiries 
develop in the U.S. workplace? 
The history of the proscription on family-status inquiries by employers 
begins with an early Supreme Court decision on Title VII, Phillips v. Martin 
Marietta Corp.46 In this 1971 case, the employer-defendant, Martin Marietta, had 
a policy against hiring women with preschool-aged children (but not men with 
 
44 Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2012). 
45 Employer Best Practices for Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY 
COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiver-best-practices.html [https://perma.cc/J6CQ-T
DYW] (last updated Jan. 19, 2011). 
46 400 U.S. 542 (1971). 
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preschool-aged children).47 The plaintiff, Ida Phillips, had preschool-aged 
children and had applied, but was rejected.48 Phillips, as a result, brought suit 
under the theory that by treating women with preschool-aged children differently 
than men with preschool-aged children, Martin Marietta was discriminating on 
the basis of sex.49 The Supreme Court agreed and endorsed a novel theory of 
liability under Title VII: the sex-plus theory.50 This theory—which has been 
subsequently advanced by plaintiffs to contest employers’ differential treatment 
of the sexes with respect to characteristics as far removed from the statutory text 
of Title VII as grooming standards51 and weight52—supports liability when an 
employer treats a certain characteristic more favorably in one sex than the employer 
treats that same characteristic in the opposite sex. In this way, the sex-plus theory 
brings employers’ differential treatment based on various characteristics not 
mentioned in the statutory text within the ambit of Title VII. 
Almost two decades after the Phillips decision, the Court decided Price 
Waterhouse v. Hopkins, a second case that laid the foundation for the EEOC 
guidance and the strong norm against family-status inquiries by employers in 
the American workplace.53 The case pitted a female employee who had been 
denied partnership against one of the nation’s largest accounting firms.54 The 
firm alleged that the employee, Ann Hopkins, had been denied partnership 
because of her “abrasiveness” with staff members and poor “interpersonal 
skills.”55 Hopkins, on the other hand, alleged that she had been denied 
partnership because of her failure to conform to female stereotypes.56 Writing 
for the plurality, Justice Brennan famously wrote, 
As for the legal relevance of sex stereotyping, we are beyond the day when an 
employer could evaluate employees by assuming or insisting that they matched 
the stereotype associated with their group, for “[i]n forbidding employers to 
 
47 Id. at 543. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Id. at 544. 
51 See, e.g., Jespersen v. Harrah’s Operating Co., 444 F.3d 1104, 1106 (9th Cir. 2006) (en banc) 
(recognizing a cause of action under Title VII for sex differentials in grooming standards). 
52 Most of the successful weight-discrimination cases under Title VII have been brought in the 
context of airline weight restrictions on female flight attendants. See, e.g., Frank v. United Airlines, 
Inc., 216 F.3d 845, 855 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that an airline’s policy of imposing weight maximums 
for flight attendants violated Title VII); Gerdom v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 692 F.2d 602, 610 (9th Cir. 
1982) (holding that an airline’s policy of requiring flight hostesses to comply with strict weight 
requirements was a violation of Title VII). 
53 490 U.S. 228 (1989). 
54 Id. at 231-32. 
55 Id. at 234-35. 
56 Id. at 235-36 (describing the advice Hopkins received from her employer to “walk more 
femininely, talk more femininely, dress more femininely, wear make-up, have her hair styled, and 
wear jewelry” (quoting Hopkins v. Price Waterhouse, 618 F. Supp. 1109, 1117 (D.D.C. 1985))). 
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discriminate against individuals because of their sex, Congress intended to strike 
at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women resulting from 
sex stereotypes.” An employer who objects to aggressiveness in women but whose 
positions require this trait places women in an intolerable and impermissible 
catch 22: out of a job if they behave aggressively and out of a job if they do not. 
Title VII lifts women out of this bind.57 
The case has henceforth stood for the proposition that discrimination on the 
basis of a sex stereotype is discrimination on the basis of sex. As such, sex 
stereotyping claims are cognizable under Title VII. 
The Court has never directly addressed the issue of family-status inquiries in 
the workplace. However, federal circuit courts have been confronted with this 
issue and understandably have relied on both Phillips and Price Waterhouse in 
reaching their decisions. For example, in King v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., the 
Eighth Circuit found that a female plaintiff had successfully established a prima 
facie case of sex-plus-family-status discrimination based on her allegation that the 
employer had asked interview questions about “her marital status, the nature of 
her relationship with another [Trans World Airlines] employee, the number of 
children she had and whether they were illegitimate, her childcare arrangements, 
and her future childbearing plans” because of her sex (i.e., the employer had not 
asked male applicants such questions).58 More recently, the First Circuit 
addressed a family-status issue in Chadwick v. WellPoint, Inc.59 Here, the court 
considered a case in which a female employee had been denied a promotion, and 
the employer explained, “It was nothing you did or didn’t do. It was just that 
you’re going to school, you have the kids and you just have a lot on your plate 
right now.”60 The court found that this statement, combined with other similar 
statements by the employer regarding the plaintiff ’s childcare responsibilities, 
could be characterized as both sex-plus and sex-stereotyping discrimination.61 
Not all circuit courts, however, have been as willing to recognize family-status 
inquiries as a form of sex discrimination. In Bruno v. City of Crown Point, for 
instance, the Seventh Circuit reversed a lower court’s judgment in favor of a 
female job applicant who had been asked about family planning and child 
 
57 Id. at 251 (citing L.A. Dep’t of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)) 
(alteration in original) (internal quotations omitted). 
58 738 F.2d 255, 256 (8th Cir. 1984); accord Back v. Hastings on Hudson Union Free Sch. Dist., 
365 F.3d 107, 115 (2d Cir. 2004) (reversing a grant of summary judgment to an employer who inquired 
how a female employee was “planning on spacing [her] offspring,” suggested she “not get pregnant until 
[the supervisor] retire[d],” and advised the employee to “wait until [her son] was in kindergarten to 
have another child”). 
59 561 F.3d 38 (1st Cir. 2009). 
60 Id. at 42. 
61 Id. at 45-49. 
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caretaking matters during her interview.62 In reaching its decision, the panel 
majority looked to Price Waterhouse and cautioned, “[t]he fact that Pyle asked 
only Bruno family-oriented questions reveals that those questions were based 
on sex stereotypes—namely, that females are the primary care providers for 
children and that the wife’s career is secondary to the husband’s.”63 However, the 
court was careful to note that “[m]erely showing the questions were asked . . . is 
not sufficient to prove intentional discrimination” under Title VII.64 
In light of these Supreme Court and federal circuit court decisions, the 
EEOC has issued guidance on appropriate interview questions for employers 
to ask in order to avoid Title VII liability. While the EEOC acknowledges that 
Title VII “do[es] not prohibit discrimination based solely on parental or other 
caregiver status,” the agency emphasizes that such considerations by employers 
may constitute sex-plus discrimination or sex stereotyping, which do violate 
Title VII.65 Accordingly, the EEOC guidance reminds employers that “[r]elying 
on stereotypes of traditional gender roles and the division of domestic and 
workplace responsibilities, [such as] . . . assum[ing] that childcare responsibilities 
will make female employees less dependable than male employees,” violates Title 
VII.66 To underscore this point, the EEOC provides several examples of what it 
considers to be “unlawful stereotyping” under Title VII.67 Two of the examples 
involve a job interview in which a female candidate is asked how many children 
she has and “how she would balance work and childcare responsibilities when the 
need arose.”68 Another example involves a supervisor asking a female worker 
who has just returned from maternity leave how she will “manage to stay on 
top of her case load while caring for an infant.”69 The clear implication of all 
the EEOC’s examples is that employers should avoid discussing work–life 
balance with women in the workplace. Good employers, according to the 
agency, keep their mouths shut. 
In theory, the agency’s guidance may sound like good policy. By 
discouraging employers from verbalizing their concerns about family matters, 
such a policy arguably helps to shield employers from Title VII liability. The 
agency’s goal is apparently to make family matters a non-issue in the 
 
62 950 F.2d 355, 357-58 (7th Cir. 1991). 
63 Id. at 362. 
64 Id. 
65 Questions and Answers About EEOC’s Enforcement Guidance on Unlawful Disparate Treatment of 
Workers with Caregiving Responsibilities, U.S. EQUAL EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.ee
oc.gov/policy/docs/qanda_caregiving.html [https://perma.cc/4ES7-6RKV] (last updated May 23, 2007). 
66 U.S. EQUAL EMP’T OPPORTUNITY COMM’N, No. 915.002, ENFORCEMENT GUIDANCE: 
UNLAWFUL DISPARATE TREATMENT OF WORKERS WITH CAREGIVING RESPONSIBILITIES 4 (2007), 
http://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/caregiving.html [https://perma.cc/HF4P-JB3C]. 
67 Id. 
68 See id. at 4-5. 
69 See id. at 5. 
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workplace. Yet by discouraging employers from having honest discussions 
about family matters and work–life balance with employees and job 
applicants, the EEOC fails to consider the ambiguity that such a policy 
creates in the minds of employers. In the next Part, we discuss why such 
ambiguity may be more harmful than helpful to female employees. 
III. CONSIDERING THE EFFECTS OF AMBIGUITY AVERSION  
IN THE WORKPLACE 
The dominant theoretical explanation for inferior labor market treatment 
of historically disadvantaged workers is statistical discrimination.70 Statistical 
discrimination arises when employers, who cannot directly observe job applicants’ 
productivity, assume that applicants have the average characteristics stereotypically 
associated with their group, whether that group is based on race, sex, ethnicity, or 
other observable characteristics. For example, theories of statistical discrimination 
predict that employers will be, on average, less likely to hire women for positions 
in which commitment to the employer is valuable since women, as a group, 
tend to exit the workforce for family-related reasons more often than men.71 
 
70 According to the economic theory of statistical discrimination, employers do not discriminate 
based on animus toward particular traits (such as race or gender). Rather, in the absence of complete 
information about a worker’s productivity, employers use these traits as proxies for productivity-related 
characteristics. In other words, employers resort to stereotypes. See generally IAN AYRES, PERVASIVE 
PREJUDICE?: UNCONVENTIONAL EVIDENCE OF RACE AND GENDER DISCRIMINATION (2001) 
(providing empirical evidence of race and gender discrimination outside of the markets governed by the 
civil rights legislation of the 1960s); RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS: THE CASE 
AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAWS (1992) (critiquing the antidiscrimination norm for 
neglecting the economic and social consequences produced by antidiscrimination laws); Dennis J. Aigner 
& Glen G. Cain, Statistical Theories of Discrimination in Labor Markets, 30 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 175 
(1977) (identifying several shortcomings of models of statistical discrimination in explaining labor market 
discrimination); Kenneth J. Arrow, Models of Job Discrimination (discussing the costs associated with 
determining individual employee productivity relative to using race as “a cheap source of information”), in 
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 83 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Kenneth J. Arrow, Some 
Mathematical Models of Race in the Labor Market (proposing that wage differentials and segregation may 
derive from discriminatory attitudes of white employees in light of costs of information), in RACIAL 
DISCRIMINATION IN ECONOMIC LIFE 187 (Anthony H. Pascal ed., 1972); Edmund S. Phelps, The 
Statistical Theory of Racism and Sexism, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 659 (1972) (theorizing that employers rely on 
characteristics such as skin color and sex as a stand-in for information about the individual applicant, 
particularly when gaining such information would be costly); see also Richard A. Posner, An Economic 
Analysis of Sex Discrimination Laws, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1311, 1320 (1989) (“Even if employers and their male 
employees and customers have no discriminatory feelings and are perfectly well informed concerning the 
average characteristics of women in the various types of job, it may be rational for employers to 
discriminate against women because of the information costs of distinguishing a particular female 
employee from the average female employee.”). 
71 See GOLDIN, supra note 29, at 214 (“Women were ‘statistically discriminated’ against because as 
a group they were more unlikely, for instance, to remain in the work force long after marriage, and as a 
group they may have been pleased with jobs that involved a minimum of training.”). 
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In the presence of policies that work to restrict information about female 
applicants, statistical discrimination may play a role in hiring decisions for 
women. Indeed, statistical discrimination may play a significant role in the 
presence of any policy that restricts information available to employers. One 
such policy that has recently received both popular and scholarly attention is 
legislation seeking to restrict employer knowledge about a job applicant’s 
criminal history (and in theory, reduce the importance of criminal history in the 
hiring process). Well-known are the devastating effects that the rapid expansion 
of the U.S. prison population since the 1980s have had on African-American men; 
one in three African-American men can now expect to go to prison during his 
lifetime.72 Having a criminal record lowers an individual’s employment and 
earnings prospects.73 Because African-Americans are seven times more likely 
than whites to be incarcerated, many scholars have observed that mass 
incarceration has contributed substantially to economic inequality between the 
two groups.74 This observation, in turn, has led to calls from both scholars and 
social advocates to limit hiring practices that consider criminal history due to 
the disparate negative impact that such considerations may have on male 
African-American job applicants. The most popular proposals call for laws that 
limit the use of criminal background checks by employers75 and for laws that 
“ban the box”76 (a popular term for laws that restrict employers from asking 
applicants about their criminal history on form job applications). 
 
72 Sara Wakefield & Christopher Uggen, Incarceration and Stratification, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 
387, 389 (2010). 
73 Accord Devah Pager, The Mark of a Criminal Record, 108 AM. J. SOC. 937, 956 (2003) (finding 
that admission of a criminal history on a job application form decreases applicants’ likelihood of being 
called for a job interview). 
74 See id. at 959 (concluding that “[t]he effect of a criminal record is . . . 40% larger for blacks than 
whites” with respect to job interview callbacks); see also DEVAH PAGER, MARKED: RACE, CRIME, AND 
FINDING WORK IN AN ERA OF MASS INCARCERATION 28-57 (2007) (considering the post-incarceration 
difficulties encountered by African-American men); Becky Pettit & Bruce Western, Mass Imprisonment 
and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration, 69 AM. SOC. REV. 151, 164-65 (2004) 
(considering the life cycle and class effects of mass incarceration on African-American men); Bruce 
Western, The Impact of Incarceration on Wage Mobility and Inequality, 67 AM. SOC. REV. 526, 541-42 
(2002) (arguing that mass incarceration contributes to persistent race-based wage gaps). 
75 See, e.g., Johnathan J. Smith, Banning the Box but Keeping the Discrimination?: Disparate Impact 
and Employers’ Overreliance on Criminal Background Checks, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 197, 199 
(2014) (arguing that employers’ use of criminal background checks raises concerns under Title VII). 
76 See, e.g., Amy P. Meek, Street Vendors, Taxicabs, and Exclusion Zones: The Impact of Collateral 
Consequences of Criminal Convictions at the Local Level, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 52-55 (2014) (highlighting 
the success of the ban-the-box movement as a way to mitigate the effects of mass incarceration); 
Christina O’Connell, Note, Ban the Box: A Call to the Federal Government to Recognize a New Form of 
Employment Discrimination, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 2801, 2832-35 (2015) (arguing for a nationwide 
ban-the-box law); see also Joseph Fishkin, The Anti-Bottleneck Principle in Employment Discrimination 
Law, 91 WASH. U. L. REV. 1429, 1455-64 (2014) (providing a brief historical overview of the advocacy 
and rationale behind the ban-the-box movement). 
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These proposals are undoubtedly well-intentioned and, at first glance, 
may sound like a good idea. Yet such policies may actually have adverse effects 
on male African-American job applicants. A 2006 empirical study, for 
instance, found that employers who performed background checks were more 
likely to hire African-American males than employers who did not perform 
such checks.77 In the absence of credible criminal history information, the 
study authors theorized that employers statistically discriminated against 
African-American men. Uninformed employers knew that African-American 
men were much more likely to have a criminal record than other applicants 
and, lacking credible information, used race as a proxy for a prior criminal 
record.78 Contrary to the arguments made by many advocates and policymakers, 
the study authors concluded that policies proscribing employer access to 
information about applicant criminal history harmed African-American men 
more than it helped them.79 
In the context of criminal background checks, racial disparities in the 
probability of a criminal record are stark and well-known, and restricting 
employer access to an applicant’s criminal history can lead employers to favor 
hiring non–African-Americans over African-Americans—that is, to statistically 
discriminate. In the context of hiring women, gender disparities in the demands 
of family responsibilities are similarly stark and well-known, so the theory of 
statistical discrimination would predict that restricting access to employer 
information regarding family matters would lead employers to favor hiring men 
over women. The theory thus provides an explanation for why employers may 
favor a male applicant over a female applicant, but says nothing about why 
employers may favor one female applicant over another female applicant. In 
this way, our framework explicitly departs from the statistical discrimination 
context, focusing on how employers make decisions between members of the 
same group in the absence of full information in order to isolate the role of 
information exchange in the employment relationship. 
Behavioral economists have long been concerned with how individuals 
make choices in the face of uncertainty, as everyday decisionmakers rarely have 
 
77 See Harry J. Holzer et al., Perceived Criminality, Criminal Background Checks, and the Racial Hiring 
Practices of Employers, 49 J.L. & ECON. 451, 465 (2006) (“Employers that check are 8.4 percentage points 
more likely to have hired an African American applicant into the most recently filled position.”). 
78 See id. at 460 (“[E]mployers that are averse to hiring ex-offenders and that do not check 
[backgrounds] are the most likely to engage in statistical discrimination.”). 
79 See id. at 473; see also Michael A. Stoll & Shawn D. Bushway, The Effect of Criminal Background 
Checks on Hiring Ex-Offenders, 7 CRIMINOLOGY & PUB. POL’Y 371, 396 (2008) (finding that because 
“some employers perform background checks to gain additional information about the ex-offenders 
whom they may consider hiring . . . [and] protect themselves against possible negligent hiring lawsuits,” 
bans on such checks may have adverse effects on applicants with a criminal history). 
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the benefit of full information.80 Within this vast economics literature, of 
particular relevance here is the line of research that explores how individuals 
make decisions when one option is ambiguous and the other option is less so. 
The typical starting point for modern economists working on this topic is a 
1961 paper by Daniel Ellsberg, who, through a series of examples, proposed that 
even when the expected value of two options is identical, individuals prefer the 
less ambiguous option over the more ambiguous option.81 Perhaps the most 
famous of Ellsberg’s examples is the “two-color problem,” a scenario in which an 
individual bets whether the color of a ball drawn at random from an urn will be 
red or black.82 If the individual has a choice of two urns upon which to bet—one 
urn in which the red/black ball distribution is known to be 50/50, the other urn 
in which the red/black ball distribution is unknown—Ellsberg’s theory predicts 
that the individual will prefer to bet on the urn with the known 50/50 
distribution.83 Despite the possibility that the unknown urn, unlike its known 
counterpart, may be filled entirely with balls of one color, individuals will still 
choose to bet on the known urn.84 
This theory, known as the Ellsberg paradox or ambiguity aversion, has 
been subsequently validated and extended by the experimental economics 
literature. A substantial literature has tested the Ellsberg scenarios in 
experimental settings;85 other authors have extended Ellsberg’s work to 
consider how individuals respond to more complex scenarios involving issues 
such as comparing levels of ambiguity aversion for gains versus losses.86 
 
80 See, e.g., Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under 
Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263, 284-86 (1979) (demonstrating that individuals give too much weight 
to low-probability outcomes when making decisions under risk). 
81 Ellsberg, supra note 21, at 668. 
82 Id. at 650-56. 
83 Id. at 651. 
84 Id.; see also Craig R. Fox & Amos Tversky, Ambiguity Aversion and Comparative Ignorance, 110 Q. 
J. ECON. 585, 585-86 (1995) (describing the two-color problem as an example demonstrating that 
“people prefer to bet on known rather than unknown probabilities”); Howard Raiffa, Risk, Ambiguity, 
and the Savage Axioms: Comment, 75 Q. J. ECON. 690, 694 (1961) (showing that the irrationality of having 
a preference for the known distribution can be demonstrated by flipping a fair coin to govern the color 
choice for the unknown urn, as doing so converts the uncertain probability to a hard probability). 
85 See, e.g., Selwyn W. Becker & Fred O. Brownson, What Price Ambiguity? Or the Role of 
Ambiguity in Decision-Making, 72 J. POL. ECON. 62, 73 (1964) (demonstrating that “some subjects, in 
violation of the Savage axioms, express an aversion to ambiguity, and under payoff conditions will 
pay to avoid it”); Paul Slovic & Amos Tversky, Who Accepts Savage’s Axiom?, 19 BEHAV. SCI. 368, 
368 (1974) (showing “subjects’ initial choices often violated [Savage’s sure-thing principle]”). 
86 See Michele Cohen et al., Individual Behavior Under Risk and Under Uncertainty: An 
Experimental Study, 18 THEORY & DECISION 203, 219 (1985) (concluding that “under uncertainty as 
under risk, there is no correlation between subject attitude in the domain of gains and in that of 
losses”); Robin M. Hogarth & Hillel J. Einhorn, Venture Theory: A Model of Decision Weights, 36 
MGMT. SCI. 780 (1990) (examining “attitudes toward risk and ambiguity as a function of different 
levels of probabilities and payoffs”); see also Colin Camerer & Martin Weber, Recent Developments in 
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Moreover, recent experimental work has found that ambiguity aversion is 
particularly acute among women.87 In spite of the volume of work on ambiguity 
aversion, the implications of this phenomenon have not been considered within 
the employment context. Prior experimental work has focused on applications to 
matters such as financial decisionmaking,88 contracts,89 and tax policy.90 
By deterring open discussion of marital status and children, Title VII 
removes the opportunity to work out reasonable accommodations at the 
hiring stage,91 leaving firms in the position of using statistical discrimination. 
Although Title VII does not require employers to reasonably accommodate 
workers’ family life, employers have become increasingly willing to make 
some voluntary accommodations, such as telecommuting,92 as a way to attract 
the best workers, boost employee morale, and even increase productivity.93 
For many employers, increasing the flow of information about family logistics 
could remove a barrier to hiring women that arises from uncertainty about 
 
Modeling Preferences: Uncertainty and Ambiguity, 5 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 325, 332-41 (1992) 
(providing a concise review of the massive ambiguity aversion literature in behavioral economics). 
87 For a survey of recent literature that finds that women display greater ambiguity aversion 
than men, see Catherine C. Eckel & Philip J. Grossman, Men, Women and Risk Aversion: Experimental 
Evidence, in HANDBOOK OF EXPERIMENTAL ECONOMICS RESULTS 1061, 1063 (John H. Kagel & 
Alvin E. Roth eds., 2008). 
88 See, e.g., Aurélien Baillon & Han Bleichrodt, Testing Ambiguity Models Through the Measurement 
of Probabilities for Gains and Losses, 7 AM. ECON. J.: MICROECONOMICS 77, 85 (2015) (asking subjects 
to take bets on the movement of a familiar stock index and an unfamiliar stock index). 
89 See, e.g., Christian Kellner & Gerhard Riener, The Effect of Ambiguity on Reward Scheme 
Choice, 125 ECON. LETTERS 134, 135-37 (2014) (demonstrating experimentally the effect of 
ambiguity on preferences for contractual compensation schemes). 
90 See, e.g., Arthur Snow & Ronald S. Warren, Jr., Ambiguity About Audit Probability, Tax Compliance, 
and Taxpayer Welfare, 43 ECON. INQUIRY 865, 870 (2005) (demonstrating through experimental evidence 
that increasing uncertainty regarding tax audit probability increases tax code compliance in “ambiguity 
averse” individuals, but has the opposite effect in “ambiguity loving” individuals). 
91 Title VII, unlike the Americans with Disabilities Act, does not require employers to reasonably 
accommodate their employees. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012) (listing unlawful employer 
practices with respect to race, color, sex, national origin, and religious discrimination without mention 
of reasonable accommodation), with 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (2012) (defining discrimination as 
including “not making reasonable accommodations” for a disabled employee). Employers may 
voluntarily accommodate their employees, however, and likely will if they believe it will improve their 
bottom line. See, e.g., NAT’L WOMEN’S LAW CTR., THE BUSINESS CASE FOR ACCOMMODATING 
PREGNANT WORKERS (2012) (submitting that employers who accommodate pregnant employees can 
expect increased employee commitment and satisfaction, recruitment and retention, productivity, 
diversity, safety, and absenteeism with “minimal and temporary” associated costs). 
92 According to a 2015 Gallup poll, 37% of U.S. workers telecommute to some extent for their job. 
Jeffrey M. Jones, In U.S., Telecommuting for Work Climbs to 37%, GALLUP (Aug. 19, 2015), http://
www.gallup.com/poll/184649/telecommuting-work-climbs.aspx [https://perma.cc/9J4B-NSUT]. 
93 See Jacob Morgan, Five Things You Need to Know About Telecommuting, FORBES (May 4, 2015, 
12:02 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacobmorgan/2015/05/04/5-things-you-need-to-know-about-
telecommuting/#2715e4857a0b368f7b2f12a0 [https://perma.cc/E8WQ-ECMM] (reporting results of 
interviews with companies that see telecommuting as “a business imperative that is required to stay 
competitive in the modern workforce”). 
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how they will achieve work–family balance. Yet under policies informed by 
the EEOC guidance, employers do not get the opportunity to engage in any 
sort of interactive process and are instead left in a state of ambiguity with 
respect to the needs of working-mother applicants. 
One solution to this dilemma, suggested by both courts and the EEOC 
guidance itself, is to mandate that employers who want to ask about family 
matters and obligations do so equally with respect to male and female 
applicants.94 Once again, this solution may seem reasonable at first glance, 
but the economics literature on gender wage disparities illuminates why such 
a solution may only exacerbate underlying concerns. There is a widely 
established and large earnings premium for married men, but not for 
women,95 so asking men and women equally about their marital status would 
tend to benefit married men in the workplace, while hurting married women. 
For all these reasons, we predict hiring practices that stifle information about 
family status may be hurting women much more than they are helping 
women. The next Part, which sets the foundation for our experimental 
design, will explain how we test this hypothesis. 
IV. EXPERIMENTAL FOUNDATIONS: EXAMINING HIRING PRACTICES 
AND THE SHORTCOMINGS OF OBSERVATIONAL DATA 
Theoretically, researchers might test the effect of policies that suppress 
family-status information on employer hiring decisions by comparing observational 
data from firms that have such policies to firms that do not. Yet identifying 
discrimination in hiring based on observational data is extremely difficult. Firms 
rarely maintain comprehensive data on applicants who were not hired, as 
evidenced by their frequent inability to produce applicant flow data during 
litigation.96 Furthermore, firms can only hire from the pool of applicants. A 
statistical gap in the employment rate of members of protected classes may be due 
to illegal discrimination in hiring on the part of the employer, but it could also be 
 
94 See supra Part II (discussing the current EEOC guidance). 
95 See Megan de Linde Leonard & T.D. Stanley, Married with Children: What Remains When 
Observable Biases Are Removed from the Reported Male Marriage Wage Premium, 33 LAB. ECON. 72, 75-79 
(2015) (presenting a meta-analysis of fifty-nine studies and 661 estimates showing a male marriage 
premium of between 9% and 13%); Sanders Korenman & David Neumark, Does Marriage Really Make Men 
More Productive?, 26 J. HUM. RESOURCES 282, 284-90 (1991) (providing an overview of the male marriage 
premium literature, including the premium’s estimated magnitude and the theories behind the premium). 
96 Indeed, the unavailability of firm applicant flow data can prove an insurmountable barrier for many 
plaintiffs trying to prove hiring discrimination. For a discussion of plaintiff proof barriers in the absence of 
applicant flow data in the context of criminal background check disparate impact cases, see Alexandra 
Harwin, Title VII Challenges to Employment Discrimination Against Minority Men with Criminal Records, 14 
BERKELEY J. AFR.-AM. L. & POL’Y 2, 16 (2012) (“While federal courts were lowering the standards for 
employers, they were elevating the standards of proof required for plaintiffs to establish disparate impact, 
effectively barring plaintiffs unable to afford expert statisticians from pursuing disparate impact claims.”). 
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the result of fewer, and potentially less qualified, applicants from the protected 
classes, which would not necessarily be illegal.97 
Consequently, economists have taken the approach of using experimental 
studies to examine discrimination in hiring. Frequently, these experiments take 
the form of a résumé audit (also called correspondence) study, in which fictitious 
résumés are sent as applications to posted job openings. The résumés are 
randomly sent in response to job openings and are designed to be identical with 
the exception of indicators to signal the job applicant’s membership in a specific 
class. In one of the most well-known résumé audit studies, Marianne Bertrand 
and Sendhil Mullainathan sent applications that differed only in whether the 
fictitious applicant had a name that was typically African-American or typically 
white; applicants with typically African-American names had a lower probability 
of receiving a callback for an interview.98 A large number of similar studies have 
been conducted to investigate the role of other types of discrimination that may 
play a role in the hiring process, including discrimination on the basis of sex,99 
duration of unemployment,100 age,101 national origin,102 religion,103 weight (using 
photos associated with résumés),104 and sexual orientation.105 
 
97 It would not be illegal unless the employer engaged in an application practice that had a disparate 
impact on a protected class, and the practice lacked job-relatedness or business necessity. See Griggs v. 
Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (“[G]ood intent or absence of discriminatory intent does not 
redeem employment procedures or testing mechanisms that operate as ‘built-in headwinds’ for minority 
groups and are unrelated to measuring job capability.”). 
98 See Marianne Bertrand & Sendhil Mullainathan, Are Emily and Greg More Employable than Lakisha 
and Jamal? A Field Experiment on Labor Market Discrimination, 94 AM. ECON. REV. 991, 997-98 (2004). 
99 See, e.g., Pascale Petit, The Effects of Age and Family Constraints on Gender Hiring Discrimination: 
A Field Experiment in the French Financial Sector, 14 LAB. ECON. 371, 382-83 (2007) (finding significant 
discrimination against women aged twenty-five relative to men aged twenty-five in high-skilled 
financial sector jobs, but not against women aged thirty-seven relative to men aged thirty-seven). 
100 See, e.g., Henry S. Farber et al., Determinants of Callbacks to Job Applications: An Audit Study, 106 
AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 314, 317 (2016) (finding no relation between callback rates and 
duration of unemployment). 
101 See, e.g., Joanna N. Lahey, Age, Women, and Hiring, 43 J. HUM. RESOURCES 30, 46 (2008) (finding 
younger applicants 42% more likely to be called back in Massachusetts and 46% more likely to be called 
back in Florida). 
102 See, e.g., Guillaume Pierné, Hiring Discrimination Based on National Origin and Religious 
Closeness: Results from a Field Experiment in the Paris Area, 2 IZA J. LAB. ECON., Dec. 2013, at 1, 8-12 
(finding significant discrimination against people of North African origin). 
103 See id. at 8 (finding significant discrimination against Muslims). 
104 See, e.g., Dan-Olof Rooth, Obesity, Attractiveness, and Differential Treatment in Hiring: A Field 
Experiment, 44 J. HUM. RESOURCES 710, 729 (2009) (finding that applicants with “average” weight 
and attractiveness are 20% more likely to receive a callback than applicants with “unfavorable” weight 
and attractiveness). 
105 See, e.g., Ali M. Ahmed et al., Are Gay Men and Lesbians Discriminated Against in the Hiring 
Process?, 79 S. ECON. J. 565, 579 (2013) (finding significant discrimination against gay and lesbian 
applicants in Sweden, though less discrimination than observed in other countries); Doris 
Weichselbaumer, Testing for Discrimination Against Lesbians of Different Marital Status: A Field 
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Résumé audit studies have been criticized on many grounds, including their 
ethics106 and their limited external validity.107 An alternative experimental approach 
to collecting data on the hiring process, and the one we use here, is a vignette study 
(also known as a factorial study in the literature). Vignette studies combine survey 
questions with experimental methods; they are an accepted and frequently used 
methodology in a number of disciplines, including social psychology, sociology, 
and law.108 This approach provides many advantages over résumé audit studies 
in the context of our research question. First, we are interested in how the 
restriction against asking for information on family status influences hiring. 
Because of the popular understanding that questions about marital status and 
children are illegal, applicants rarely provide information about their family 
situation on their résumés; as a result, any fictitious résumés we might create 
would automatically be suspect. Second, a vignette study allows us to construct 
a plausible situation in which family status may be relevant in hiring. Because 
most recent college graduates enter the labor market following graduation, 
targeting only the kinds of entry-level jobs that are typically used in résumé 
audit studies would not allow sufficient variation in family status. 
As a result, our vignette study focuses on reentry of college graduate women 
who have left the workforce for a sustained period of time. In order to achieve 
adequate variation in family status, our scenario describes women who would 
be in their early forties and who have had a ten-year interruption in their work 
history. Although the employment prospects of returning stay-at-home 
mothers versus new labor market entrants have not been formally compared 
 
Experiment, 54 INDUS. REL. 131, 156 (2015) (finding significant discrimination against lesbian 
applicants in Munich, though no significant discrimination in Berlin). 
106 See, e.g., Devah Pager, The Use of Field Experiments for Studies of Employment Discrimination: 
Contributions, Critiques, and Directions for the Future, 609 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 104, 
126-27 (2007) (identifying potential harm to subjects of discrimination field experiments, including loss of 
time and legal liability); Peter A. Riach & Judith Rich, Deceptive Field Experiments of Discrimination: Are 
They Ethical?, 57 KYKLOS 457, 459 (2004) (calling for attention to ethical implications of discrimination 
field experiments on grounds of deception and absence of informed consent). 
107 The principal criticisms are that (1) these studies are only useful for examining callbacks 
for entry-level jobs, and (2) relatedly, these studies are only useful for firms that conduct traditional 
job searches. See Dan-Olof Rooth, Correspondence Testing Studies, 58 IZA WORLD LAB., May 2014, 
at 1, 5-6 (discussing external validity concerns in correspondence studies). 
108 See Guillermina Jasso, Factorial Survey Methods for Studying Beliefs and Judgments, 34 SOC. 
METHODS & RES. 334, 410-11 (2006) (advocating for the use of the factorial survey method, which 
“would make possible quantitative assessment of the precise effects of age, experience, and other factors 
on the components of beliefs/judgments”); Peter H. Rossi & Andy B. Anderson, The Factorial Survey 
Approach: An Introduction, in MEASURING SOCIAL JUDGMENTS: THE FACTORIAL SURVEY 
APPROACH 15 (Peter H. Rossi & Steven L. Nock eds., 1982); Lisa Wallander, 25 Years of Factorial 
Surveys in Sociology: A Review, 38 SOC. SCI. RES. 505, 508 (2009) (reviewing 106 vignette studies in 
sociology over three decades, of which forty-nine addressed topics in crime, law, and deviance). 
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through empirical analysis,109 an abundance of anecdotal evidence suggests that 
returning mothers’ prospects are far weaker.110 Given the limited number of 
available, relevant jobs to which we could submit fictitious, yet realistic 
résumés, conducting a résumé audit study would require an enormous sample 
size to detect statistically significant differences in callbacks, once again making 
the résumé audit approach undesirable. 
Likely all of the above concerns with résumé audit studies have led vignette 
studies to become the more common approach among legal scholars in 
experimental work. Legal scholarship has frequently relied upon vignette studies 
to draw inferences regarding individual behavior in the negotiation, formation, 
assent, and breach of contracts.111 Legal scholarship has also seen several recent 
vignette studies testing juror understanding and juror decisionmaking,112 as well 
as testing intellectual property law concepts.113 Nevertheless, such studies have 
been virtually absent from employment law scholarship. The only vignette study 
 
109 For a résumé audit study demonstrating that older women are less likely than younger 
women to receive interview requests for entry-level jobs, see Lahey, supra note 101, at 37. 
110 See, e.g., Kelly Wallace, Moms ‘Opting In’ to Work Find Doors Shut, CNN (Aug. 13, 2013, 3:41 PM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/08/13/living/parents-mothers-opt-to-work/index.html [https://perma.cc/26TH
-753Z] (reporting on a survey conducted by a small, local nonprofit that found “38.3% [of stay-at-home 
mothers] said they wanted to return but were having difficulty getting back in, and an ‘overwhelming’ 
53.7% cited resistance to hiring because of their stay-at-home status”); Tara Weiss, How Stay-at-Home 
Moms Can Get Back to Work, FORBES (May 19, 2009, 5:15 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/05/19/
relaunch-career-woman-leadership-careers-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/6FX6-RJC7] (“Returning to work 
is a challenge even in a strong job market . . . .”). 
111 See, e.g., Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, Breach Is for Suckers, 63 VAND. L. 
REV. 1003, 1022-32 (2010) (conducting a vignette study to analyze perceptions of contract breach); 
Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Common Sense of Contract Formation, 67 STAN. L. 
REV. 1269, 1281-95 (2015) (conducting a vignette study to analyze subjects’ intuitions about contract 
formation); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & David A. Hoffman, The Psychology of Contract Precautions, 80 U. 
CHI. L. REV. 395, 408-18 (2013) (conducting a vignette study to analyze parties’ diverging approaches 
to self-protection before and after they perceive that they have reached final agreement). 
112 See, e.g., Matthew R. Ginther et al., The Language of Mens Rea, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1327, 1349-58 
(2014) (studying juror perceptions of mens rea culpability categories); Joni Hersch & Beverly 
Moran, Coitus and Consequences in the Legal System: An Experimental Study, 68 SMU L. REV. 927, 
935-44 (2015) (investigating whether and how knowledge of a previous sexual relationship between 
legal adversaries influences subjects’ perceptions of appropriate outcome in civil actions); Justin 
Sevier, Testing Tribe’s Triangle: Juries, Hearsay, and Psychological Distance, 103 GEO. L.J. 879, 903-922 
(2015) (investigating juror discernment of hearsay evidence); Francis X. Shen et al., Sorting Guilty 
Minds, 86 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1306, 1326-44 (2011) (measuring subjects’ ability to apply the legal 
definitions of mens rea in specific factual contexts). 
113 See, e.g., Ian Ayres et al., A Randomized Experiment Assessing the Accuracy of Microsoft’s “Bing 
It On” Challenge, 26 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 1, 23-24 (2013) (finding that subjects typically preferred 
Google search results over Bing results, suggesting potentially actionable misleading advertising in 
Microsoft’s “Bing It On” campaign); Shyamkrishna Balganesh et al., Judging Similarity, 100 IOWA L. 
REV. 267, 289 (2014) (finding that evidence on other potential issues in a copyright claim significantly 
influences the assessment of the two works’ similarity); Christopher Buccafusco et al., Experimental Tests 
of Intellectual Property Laws’ Creativity Thresholds, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1921, 1946-71 (2014) (testing use of a 
creativity threshold as an incentive in patent law). 
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that has any relevance to employment law is a 2013 article by Ian Ayres and 
Richard Luedeman, which examined whether the type of sexual activity among 
gay men influenced subjects’ likelihood of inviting them to a barbecue event.114 
Although the vignette itself did not relate to employment, the authors 
extrapolated the results to consider implications for Title VII sex stereotyping 
claims brought by lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) individuals 
under Price Waterhouse.115 As evidenced by the Ayres and Luedeman article—not 
to mention the vignette studies in other areas of legal scholarship—vignette 
studies present a unique opportunity to study the effects of employment laws, 
both in the workplace and in the courtroom, that are otherwise untestable 
through observational data. For all these reasons, we chose a vignette study for 
our experiment, which is detailed in the next Part. 
V. EXPERIMENTAL METHODOLOGY 
For our vignette study, we designed a realistic scenario based on the situation 
women face when reentering the labor market after an extended period out of 
the workforce as a stay-at-home mother. Our scenario asks respondents to choose 
between two female applicant finalists to hire. Both applicants have a period of 
successful work experience before leaving the workforce for a ten-year period. 
The gap in their employment history implies that the applicants were unlikely 
to be able to resume their careers at the level they held when they exited. But 
their work history also indicates that an entry-level job would not be suitable for 
long. Extensive literature on job mismatch shows that overqualified workers are 
less satisfied with their jobs and more likely to quit, particularly when the job 
lacks sufficient opportunity for promotion.116 Consequently, faced with training 
 
114 See generally Ian Ayres & Richard Luedeman, Tops, Bottoms, and Versatiles: What Straight Views of 
Penetrative Preferences Could Mean for Sexuality Claims Under Price Waterhouse, 123 YALE L.J. 714 (2013). 
115 490 U.S. 228 (1989); see also id. at 714 (concluding that contrary to the decisions of some 
federal courts, some sexuality-related sex stereotyping claims are viable under the Price Waterhouse line 
of cases, since “[t]here are real forms of gender-motivated prejudice against a person’s sexuality that are 
distinct from prejudice against having actual or desired partners of the same sex”). 
116 Job matching (and mismatching) is a term widely used by economists to signify the fit (or lack 
thereof) between the requirements of the job at hand and the education and skills of the applicant hired 
to do the job. See generally Jim Allen & Rolf van der Velden, Educational Mismatches Versus Skill 
Mismatches: Effects on Wages, Job Satisfaction, and On-the-Job Search, 53 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 434 
(2001) (exploring the effect of education–job mismatches on wages and job satisfaction); see also Greg 
J. Duncan & Saul D. Hoffman, The Incidence and Wage Effects of Overeducation, 1 ECON. EDUC. REV. 
75, 84 (1981) (finding that overeducated workers are more highly paid than their adequately educated 
and undereducated peers); Joni Hersch, Optimal ‘Mismatch’ and Promotions, 33 ECON. INQUIRY 611, 
623 (1995) (arguing that it is in a firm’s best interest to have at least some overqualified workers); 
Boyan Jovanovic, Job Matching and the Theory of Turnover, 87 J. POL. ECON. 972, 975-82 (1979) 
(constructing a model to explain the rate of turnover as a function of worker productivity); Nachum 
Sicherman, “Overeducation” in the Labor Market, 9 J. LAB. ECON. 101, 103-05 (1991) (exploring the 
demographic characteristics of “overeducated” workers); Richard R. Verdugo & Naomi Turner 
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and hiring costs, employers may refrain from hiring overqualified workers.117 
We therefore stressed in our scenario that even though the job was entry-level, 
advancement was rapid. 
Because we examined hiring decisions between a pair of women of similar 
age and background, we did not expect animus- or taste-based discrimination118 
to be a relevant factor. As explained in Part III, we also did not anticipate 
statistical discrimination to be relevant since observers should have drawn 
similar inferences about the family status of similarly situated women. We 
allowed for actual productivity differences by providing different information 
about our candidates so that any differences in the perceived variance of 
productivity-related characteristics would be based on information provided in 
the vignette, rather than assumptions about unobserved characteristics. 
With these issues in mind, we designed our vignette study to present 
respondents with different backgrounds and motivations for each of the two 
female candidates seeking re-employment. After drafting our survey instrument, 
we extensively pretested it and received approval from our university’s 
Institutional Review Board. We fielded the final survey instrument on 3022 
voluntary workers who opted in to perform tasks via Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(mTurk) service.119 Workers eligible for participation had to be at least eighteen 
years old and had to reside in the United States. We paid $1.50 to each worker 
who successfully completed the survey, which we advised would take (and, on 
average, actually took) about fifteen minutes to complete.120 In accordance with 
 
Verdugo, The Impact of Surplus Schooling on Earnings, 24 J. HUM. RESOURCES 629, 640 (1989) (finding 
that overeducated workers often earn less than their adequately educated and undereducated peers). 
117 See Hersch, supra note 116, at 619-20 (finding that employers hire overqualified workers 
because they have lower training costs and are more likely to be promoted, although those 
overqualified workers who are not promoted are more likely to quit). 
118 Here, we use the term “taste-based discrimination” in the same manner used by Gary Becker to 
refer to discrimination against African-Americans in his classic 1957 work The Economics of Discrimination. 
GARY BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION 14 (2d ed. 1971). 
119 Our survey complied on all dimensions with the Guidelines for Academic Requesters using mTurk 
workers as disseminated by Dynamo. Dynamo is an online community platform, similar to the Reddit 
platform, created by top academic mTurk users for the purpose of gathering and sharing information among 
peers. See generally Guidelines for Academic Requesters, DYNAMO WIKI, http://wiki.wearedynamo.org/in
dex.php/Guidelines_for_Academic_Requesters [https://perma.cc/4XJA-9V5Q] (last updated July 23, 2016). 
120 Readers unfamiliar with mTurk may be surprised that we obtained more than 3000 responses 
within a single day, with payment for survey completion equivalent to $6.00 an hour. Relatedly, readers 
may be concerned that only individuals with a low value of time would bother to complete a fifteen-minute 
survey for a payment of $1.50. To quell such concerns, we compared the demographic characteristics of 
our respondents to those of the U.S. population. A comparison to census data shows that our 
respondents were either very similar to, or better educated and more likely to be employed, relative to 
the U.S. population. For example, our sample was 51.5% female, compared to 50.8% of the U.S. 
population. The median household income in our sample was $52,500 (which we derived using 
bracketed income ranges), compared to $53,545 nationally. The share of respondents who report their 
race as white only in our sample was 80.6%, slightly above the U.S. population share of single race 
white of 77.4%. The share in our sample reporting single race black/African-American was 7.5%, and 
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prior mTurk research, we launched our survey on a weekday during East Coast 
daylight hours.121 Our survey provided a total of four scenarios; below, we limit 
our discussion to the one scenario of relevance to this Article.122 
Experimental subjects, who were directed from mTurk to the survey 
instrument,123 were randomly assigned to view one of nine experimental 
conditions that varied the explanation (or provided no information) for the 
ten-year employment gap that was common to each of the two finalists. All 
subjects were given the following information: 
Assume you work at a medium-sized financial management firm. Your firm has 
a vacancy for the position of Research Analyst, and you have been asked to make 
the hiring decision. Although this is an entry-level position, advancement is 
often rapid, with high earnings potential. 
After reviewing many applications, you narrow the field down to 2 candidates, 
Lisa Davis and Jessica Wilson. 
In many ways, the résumés for Lisa and Jessica show similar educational 
background and work histories. Each received her college degree 20 years ago, 
each majored in psychology, and each worked for 10 years after college as a 
Research Associate in a medium-sized financial management firm. Neither lists 
any work experience for the past 10 years. 
Lisa Davis is a graduate of a well-known, elite university. 
Jessica Wilson is a graduate of a local public university. 
 
reporting Hispanic/Latino was 7.3%. The corresponding U.S. population shares are 13.2% 
black/African-American and 17.4% Hispanic/Latino. Our sample was far more educated than the U.S. 
population, with 54.1% of those age 25 and older holding bachelor’s degrees or higher, in contrast to 
28.8% in the U.S. population. Our sample employment rate was also higher, with 81.2% of our sample 
employed, compared to 59.5% nationally. Our sample was on average younger than the average U.S. 
worker with a median age of 32 versus 42.4 among employed persons in the U.S. population. Overall, 
when our sample differed from the population, the direction favored the characteristics associated with 
decisionmakers in the employment setting. 
121 See Ilyana Kuziemko et al., How Elastic Are Preferences for Redistribution? Evidence from 
Randomized Survey Experiments, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 1478, 1484 (2015) (“[T]o further discourage 
foreign workers, we tried to launch our surveys during East Coast daylight hours (and, to reduce 
heterogeneity, only on workdays).”). We launched our survey on Monday, December 7, 2015, at 8:30 
a.m. EST and met our target of 3000 valid responses that same day. 
122 Our survey contained two hiring scenarios asking subjects to choose between two eligible 
candidates (the present Article reports the results of one of these scenarios). Our survey also contained 
two scenarios asking subjects to distribute marital assets between divorcing spouses. 
123 This survey was programmed using the survey software, Qualtrics. This methodology (recruiting 
workers from mTurk and redirecting them to a Qualtrics survey) is extremely common for scholars 
conducting vignette study research. See, e.g., Balganesh et al., supra note 113, at 279. 
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In all nine versions of the scenario, each candidate also reports that she 
realizes finding a job is difficult after a ten-year employment gap and that she 
is open to working in any industry and at an entry-level job. 
We intentionally chose the names for our candidates to be common and 
neutral with respect to signals of race and social class.124 We also structured 
the finalist candidates to differ only in the status of the academic institution 
that conferred their undergraduate degree, in order to make the candidates 
similar in background while still allowing the two candidates to differ on an 
observable characteristic that may relate to productivity.125 Because our 
scenario stresses opportunity for rapid advancement, implying that long-term 
attachment to the employer is valued, we were interested in which signal 
provided by graduation from an elite institution would dominate—ability or 
labor force attachment—when all other attributes of the two candidates were 
the same. After establishing the candidates’ common background, we varied 
the reasons given for leaving the workforce ten years ago and for deciding to 
return to the workforce. To focus on the role of ambiguity aversion among 
decisionmakers, the provided information (described below) does not 
indicate whether the candidate would be more or less productive as an 
employee than the candidate who did not provide information. 
Our nine combinations are as follows, with the letters A through I 
indicating which version of the scenarios included that information for at 
least one of the candidates. 
 
124 For our candidates, we chose neutral-sounding names that have been common over a long period 
of time so that survey subjects would be unlikely to associate the names with any particular time period. 
(Contrast, for instance, Mildred, the sixth most popular name in the 1910s, and Madison, the second most 
popular name in the 2000s. Top Names of the 1910s, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/baby
names/decades/names1910s.html [https://perma.cc/8SCQ-NQEL].) Given the information we provided 
on our candidates’ work history, Lisa and Jessica would have been born in the 1970s. At the time, Lisa was 
the sixth most common female baby name, and Jessica the eleventh. Top Names of the 1970s, SOC. SEC. 
ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/babynames/decades/names1970s.html [https://perma.cc/ZET4-PPJH]. 
Furthermore, Lisa and Jessica have retained considerable staying power as female baby names. Over the 
past one hundred years, the name Lisa is the fifteenth most common name, and Jessica is the eighth most 
common name. Top Names over the Last 100 Years, SOC. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.ssa.gov/oact/baby
names/decades/century.html [https://perma.cc/S5TX-4UCR]. We also chose common surnames. In the 
1970s, the surname Davis was the eighth most common surname, and the surname Wilson was the tenth 
most common surname. OFFICE OF OPERATIONAL POLICY & PROCEDURES, DEP’T HEALTH & 
HUMAN SERVS., SSA PUB. NO. 42-004, REPORT OF DISTRIBUTION OF SURNAMES IN THE SOCIAL 
SECURITY NUMBER FILE, SEPTEMBER 1, 1984, 65, 105 (1985), http://hdl.handle.net/2027/mdp.39015029
219030?urlappend=%3Bseq=1 [https://perma.cc/6XS9-VEX4]. 
125 Our primary objective was to provide some distinction between candidates, though subjects may 
have made inferences about the candidates’ workforce commitment based on information about where the 
candidate attended college. See Joni Hersch, Opting Out Among Women with Elite Education, 11 REV. ECON. 
HOUSEHOLD 469, 480-81 (2013) (demonstrating that among married women with children, labor market 
activity is lower among graduates of elite institutions than graduates of non-elite institutions). 
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Scenario A (both candidates married and reason for reentry is children in school): 
During the interview, each candidate voluntarily explains that, because she and 
her husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she 
stopped working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. 
Now that the children are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work. 
Scenario E (both candidates divorced and reason for reentry is financial): During the 
interview, each candidate voluntarily explains that, because she and her 
husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped 
working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Each 
candidate is recently divorced from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs 
to go back to work. 
Scenarios B and D (one candidate married and reason for reentry is children in school, 
one candidate divorced and reason for reentry is financial): During the interview, 
Lisa (alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband 
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working 
for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Now that the 
children are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work. . . . During 
the interview, Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) voluntarily explains that, because she 
and her husband believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she 
stopped working for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. 
She is recently divorced from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs to go 
back to work. 
Scenarios C and G (one candidate married and reason for reentry is children in school, 
one candidate gives no reason for leaving or reentering): During the interview, Lisa 
(alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband 
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working 
for pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. Now that the children 
are in school during the day, she wants to go back to work. . . . During the interview, 
Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) does not explain her 10-year employment gap. 
Scenarios F and H (one candidate divorced and reason for reentry is financial, one 
candidate gives no reason for leaving or reentering): During the interview, Lisa 
(alternatively, Jessica) voluntarily explains that, because she and her husband 
believed they could live comfortably on his earnings alone, she stopped working for 
pay 10 years ago when the first of her 2 children was born. She is recently divorced 
from her ex-husband, and, financially, she needs to go back to work. . . . During the 
interview, Jessica (alternatively, Lisa) does not explain her 10-year employment gap. 
Scenario I (neither candidate gives a reason for leaving or reentering): During the 
interview, neither candidate explains her 10-year employment gap. 
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Finally, all versions of the scenario concluded as follows: 
Each candidate has strong references, and after the interviews, you believe 
that you could easily work with either candidate. 
Which candidate will you hire for the position of Research Analyst? 
At this point, we asked subjects to select either Lisa Davis or Jessica Wilson. 
Here we note that personal information for reentering the workforce, in sharp 
contrast to academic credentials or prior work experience, does not provide clear 
signals about expected productivity. For instance, some may view a candidate 
who reports she is returning to the workforce because her children are in school 
during the day to be eager to return to work and likely to be highly productive, 
while others may view this same woman as likely to quit if work–family balance 
becomes too challenging. Similarly, the divorced candidate may be perceived as 
financially motivated to be productive, or as less productive because of greater 
childcare demands falling on a single parent. Thus, relative to an alternative 
candidate who provides no personal information for reentering the workforce, 
there is no reason to expect that, on average, the candidate who provides 
information will be more productive than one who does not. Nonetheless, the 
additional information may bolster decisionmakers’ confidence in their assessment 
of the candidate’s likely future productivity. As the results from our experiment 
show, decisionmakers choose the candidate who provides more personal 
information over the candidate who does not provide personal information, 
consistent with the theory of ambiguity aversion. 
VI. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
The employment outcome of interest is whether experimental subjects 
choose to hire Lisa, the elite university graduate, or Jessica, the local public 
university graduate. We examine how information revealed in interviews 
influence hiring decisions in two ways. First, we examine which of the two 
candidates is selected within a given scenario. Because the choice of one 
candidate implies that the other candidate is not chosen, the appropriate 
statistical test is a one-sample test of proportions. Our null hypothesis is that 
the probability of hiring either candidate is the same and is equal to 0.50. The 
relevant alternative hypotheses vary by scenario and are indicated in the 
following Sections. Second, we examine how the probability that a candidate 
is selected will vary based on the differences in the information provided 
about that candidate, holding all else equal. For instance, we examine how the 
probability that Lisa is hired differs when she is divorced versus when she is 
married, holding constant the information provided about Jessica. Because 
this test is across scenarios, and because subjects see only one of the nine 
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scenarios, each scenario comprises an independent sample. For these tests 
within individuals, the appropriate statistical test is a two-sample test for 
differences in proportions. The null hypothesis is that the probability a 
specific candidate is hired is equal across scenarios. Again, because hiring one 
candidate implies that the other candidate is not chosen, it does not matter 
which candidate’s probability of being hired we examine. 
A. Testing Candidate Selection Within a Single Scenario 
Before describing our results, we pause to detail (1) the specifics of each 
test and (2) our ex ante predictions. First, when both candidates provide the 
same information (scenarios A, E, and I), we test for whether one candidate 
is more likely to be hired than the other, but we make no prediction about 
whether the signal of Lisa’s elite degree will make it more likely that she is 
hired over Jessica because of her expected greater ability, or less likely to be 
hired because her elite degree is associated with weaker labor force 
attachment. Second, when one candidate provides a reason for the gap in her 
employment history and the other does not (scenarios C, F, G, H), we predict 
that the candidate who provides a reason is more likely to be hired. This 
follows from the behavioral economics theory of ambiguity aversion. Finally, 
when one candidate gives her reason for reentering the workforce as financial 
and the other gives her reason as children in school (scenarios B and D), we 
predict that the candidate whose reason is financial is more likely to be hired. 
Table 1 reports the results for scenarios A, E, and I. When both candidates 
provide the same information, we find that Lisa (elite degree) is more likely 
to be hired than Jessica when both are married and report the reason for 
reentry is children in school. Similarly, we find that Lisa is more likely to be 
hired when neither candidate reports any information. The probability that 
Lisa is more likely to be hired relative to the null that each candidate is equally 
likely to be hired is statistically significant at the 5% level in a two-sided test, 
with precisely the same share—56.1%—preferring to hire Lisa in both of these 
scenarios. In contrast, when both candidates are divorced and report that their 
reason for reentry is financial, there is no statistically significant difference in 
the probability that Lisa or Jessica is hired. 
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Table 1: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When Both Candidates 
Provide the Same Reason for Reentry 
Scenario Marital 
Status 
Reason 
for Reentry 
Percent  
Who Would 
Hire Lisa 
P-Value N 
 
A Married Children in 
school 
56.1 0.03 337 
E Divorced Financial 51.8 0.51 338 
I None None 56.1 0.03 337 
Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated 
using a one-sample test of proportions. 
 
Table 2 reports the results for scenarios C, F, G, and H. When one 
candidate provides a reason for reentry but the other does not, the candidate 
who provides the reason is far more likely to be hired. As Table 2 shows, when 
Lisa provides information about marital status and reason for reentry (and 
Jessica provides no information), Lisa is selected by 86.5% of the subjects when 
she is married and by 88.9% when she is divorced. Conversely, when Jessica 
provides information about marital status and reason for reentry (and Lisa 
provides no information), Jessica is selected by 81.5% of the subjects when she 
is married and by 80.4% when she is divorced. The slight edge that Lisa has 
over Jessica in being selected derives from her higher baseline likelihood of 
being hired, which apparently reflects the employment advantage of her elite 
undergraduate degree. 
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Table 2. Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When One Candidate  
   Provides a Reason for Reentry and the Other Candidate Does Not 
Scenario Marital 
Status 
Reason for 
Reentry 
Percent 
Who Would 
Hire Lisa
P-Value N 
 
 
C 
 
Lisa 
married 
Lisa 
children in 
school
 
86.5 
 
0.00 
 
334 
F 
Lisa 
divorced 
Lisa 
financial 
88.9 0.00 334 
G 
Jessica 
married 
Jessica 
children in 
school
18.5 0.00 336 
 
H 
 
 
Jessica 
divorced 
 
 
Jessica 
financial 
 
19.6 
 
 
0.00 
 
 
332 
 
Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated 
using a one-sample test of proportions. 
 
These findings show that decisionmakers overwhelmingly demonstrate 
ambiguity aversion when deciding whom to hire. Moreover, as long as candidates 
provide a reason for their reentry into the workforce, the actual reason itself 
matters little. Furthermore, as indicated below in Table 2A, women are more 
likely than men to hire the candidate who provides a reason for reentry. In both 
scenarios in which Jessica is the candidate providing information, the difference 
by sex of subject is statistically significant at the 10% level. These results are in 
accordance with prior work by economists,126 who have previously demonstrated 
that women are more ambiguity-averse than are men. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
126 See generally Eckel & Grossman, supra note 87 (surveying experimental literature in economics 
showing that women demonstrate more ambiguity aversion than men). 
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Table 2A: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When One Candidate 
Provides a Reason for Reentry and the Other Candidate  
Does Not, by Sex of Subject 
Scenario Marital 
Status 
Reason 
for 
Reentry 
Percent Who 
Would Hire 
Lisa - Male 
Percent Who 
Would Hire 
Lisa - Female 
P-Value for 
Test of 
Differences 
by Sex of 
Subject 
N 
(Male/ 
Female) 
 
C 
 
Lisa 
married 
 
Lisa 
children 
in school
 
83.8 
 
88.7 
 
0.19 
 
148/186 
F 
Lisa 
divorced 
Lisa 
financial 
87.0 90.8 0.27 161/173 
G 
Jessica 
married 
Jessica 
children 
in school
22.6 14.5 0.06 164/172 
H 
Jessica 
divorced 
Jessica 
financial 
26.5 14.1 0.00 147/185 
Notes: Null hypothesis is that male and female subjects are equally likely to offer the same candidate the job. P-value is 
calculated using a two-sample test of proportions. 
 
Table 3 reports the results for scenarios B and D. When both candidates 
provide a reason for reentry but one candidate’s reason is financial and the 
other’s is children in school, the candidate seeking work for financial reasons is 
far more likely to be hired. Table 3 demonstrates that when Jessica reports a 
divorce-related financial reason for reentry and Lisa’s reason for reentry is 
children in school, 64.4% of subjects hire Jessica. Conversely, when Lisa reports 
a divorce-related financial reason for reentry and Jessica’s reason for reentry is 
children in school, 73.9% of subjects hire Lisa. Once again, we attribute the 
slight edge that Lisa has over Jessica to the higher baseline likelihood of being 
hired that seems to relate to Lisa’s elite undergraduate degree. 
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Table 3: Probability That a Candidate Is Hired When the Reason for Reentry 
Is Financial Versus When the Reason Is Children in School 
Scenario Marital 
Status 
Reason 
for 
Reentry
Percent 
Who Would 
Hire Lisa
P-Value N 
 
B 
Lisa 
married, 
Jessica 
divorced 
Lisa 
children in 
school, 
Jessica 
financial 
35.6 
 
0.00 
 
 
337 
 
 
D 
Lisa 
divorced, 
Jessica 
married 
 
Lisa 
financial, 
Jessica 
children in 
school 
73.9 
 
0.00 
 
337 
 
Notes: Null hypothesis is that candidates are equally likely to be offered the job. P-value is calculated 
using a one-sample test of proportions. 
 
B. Testing Candidate Selection Across Multiple Scenarios 
Next, we examine candidate selection across more than one scenario. We 
consider how the probability that a candidate is hired is affected by differences 
in her marital status and her reason for reentry when the other candidate’s 
characteristics are held constant. Before describing our results, we pause to 
detail (1) the specifics of each test and (2) our ex ante predictions. Ex ante, we 
predict that, all else equal, when a candidate reports any reason for reentry, she 
is more likely to be hired than when she does not report a reason. We also 
expect that a candidate is more likely to be hired when she reports her reason 
for reentry is financial instead of children in school. We report the actual results 
of our two-sample test for differences in proportions below in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Probability That Lisa Is Hired When Her Characteristics Differ, 
Holding Jessica’s Characteristics Constant 
 Lisa 
Married, 
Children 
in School
Lisa 
Divorced, 
Financial 
Lisa, No 
Information 
Significant 
Differences 
Between 
Scenarios 
 
Jessica 
Married, 
Children in 
School 
56.1 (A) 73.9 (D) 18.5 (G) All 
  
Jessica 
Divorced, 
Financial 
35.6 (B) 51.8 (E) 19.6 (H) All 
  
Jessica, No 
Information 86.5 (C) 88.9 (F) 56.1 (I) C - I, F - I 
Notes: Scenario tested is in parentheses following the estimated probability of hiring Lisa. Statistical 
significance in differences at the 1% level is calculated using a two-sample test for differences in proportions. 
 
Table 4 demonstrates that giving a reason for reentry, and what that 
reason is, both have a strong influence on the probability a candidate is hired. 
When both Lisa and Jessica report that their reason for reentry is children in 
school, subjects prefer to hire Lisa 56.1% of the time. But if Lisa is instead 
divorced and reentering because of financial need, while Jessica’s reason 
remains children in school, the probability Lisa is hired increases by 17.8 
percentage points. Providing children in school as her reason for reentry, 
relative to providing no information, increases the probability that Lisa is 
hired by 37.6 percentage points (holding constant Jessica reporting children 
in school as her reason for reentry). Yet providing a financial reason for 
reentry, relative to providing no information, increases the probability that 
Lisa is hired by an astonishing 55.4 percentage points. 
As we noted earlier in Table 1, when both Lisa and Jessica report they are 
divorced and have a financial reason for reentry, Lisa and Jessica have exactly 
the same statistical probability of being hired. Holding constant Jessica 
reporting a financial reason for reentry, Table 4 demonstrates that the 
probability Lisa is hired is 16.2 percentage points higher when her reason for 
reentry is financial, as compared to when her reason for reentry is children in 
school. Once again, as long as Lisa reports any reason for reentry, there is a large 
increase in the probability that Lisa is hired. When Lisa reenters because of 
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children in school, there is a 16.0 percentage point increase, and when Lisa 
reenters for financial reasons, there is a 32.2 percentage point increase. 
Finally, holding constant Jessica not providing any reason for reentry, the 
results in the last row demonstrate that when only one candidate provides a 
reason for reentry, she is overwhelmingly more likely to be hired. There is no 
significant difference in the probability that Lisa is hired when her reason for 
reentry is children in school versus when her reason for reentry is financial. 
CONCLUSION 
The results in Part VI unambiguously indicate that providing more 
information is better for female applicants returning to the workforce. Yet as 
discussed in Part I,127 the EEOC guidance restricts the flow of such information 
by discouraging employers from broaching the subject of family. This guidance 
reflects a widespread, overly cautious reading of the Title VII case law; employers, 
understandably, would rather be safe than sorry when it comes to liability.128 The 
practical result of such a reading, however, is a strong employer-side norm that 
shuts down employer-initiated inquiries about family status. The reality for 
women who are returning to the workplace after a family-status-related career 
break is that employers are too afraid to ask the questions they want, and 
arguably need, to ask about breaks in candidates’ employment histories. Unless 
these women volunteer their family-status information, potential employers 
remain in a state of uncertainty, forced to answer their underlying questions about 
a résumé gap with little to go on other than stereotypes and assumptions—precisely 
what Title VII is meant to avoid. 
Compounding this harm is the strong employee-side norm that has developed 
against returning female applicants volunteering their family status. The origin 
of the employee-side norm may have emerged from a desire to conform to the 
standard model of the dedicated worker who prioritizes work over family, or it 
may derive from yet another misunderstanding of Title VII’s prohibitions. In any 
event, the employee-side norm exacerbates the information-restricting effects of 
the EEOC guidance and employer-side norm by ensuring that many employers 
remain in a state of ambiguity when trying to interpret a break in female 
applicants’ employment histories. This state of ambiguity may well lead 
employers to avoid hiring women not because they would rather hire men, but 
because they prefer certainty over uncertainty. Men are less likely to have 
 
127 See supra text accompanying note 42. 
128 This observation is reminiscent of the precautionary principle in the risk context. See generally 
Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (2003) (reviewing the 
limitations of regulatory approaches to risk that adopt the precautionary principle of better safe than 
sorry); W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 547 (2000) (documenting 
the concerns that major corporations have with respect to liability risks). 
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family-related career gaps on their résumé;129 as such, there is simply less 
opportunity for ambiguity in the résumés of male applicants. 
Our results necessarily raise two questions. First, how could a well-intentioned 
employment discrimination law and its surrounding jurisprudence backfire on 
precisely the group it was meant to protect? Second, is there a way to relieve the 
information-restricting effects that have developed around Title VII, whether 
through EEOC guidance or case law, without simultaneously undoing the positive 
effects Title VII has had on the workplace? We suggest that one potential model 
for restoring the flow of information is the interactive process model used under 
the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA). When an individual has a disability 
that affects their ability to work, and the individual desires a disability-related 
reasonable accommodation from an employer, the EEOC guidance recommends 
that the parties engage in an interactive process: 
After a request for accommodation has been made, the next step is for the parties 
to begin the interactive process to determine what, if any, accommodation should 
be provided. This means that the individual requesting the accommodation and the 
[Disability Program Manager] must communicate with each other about the request, 
the precise nature of the problem that is generating the request, how a disability is 
prompting a need for an accommodation, and alternative accommodations that may 
be effective in meeting an individual’s needs.130 
The interactive process is not codified in the statutory text of the ADA; it is 
an innovation of the EEOC guidance, meant to further the underlying purposes 
of the ADA. Despite its common origins in the EEOC, the ADA guidance is 
diametrically opposed to the Title VII guidance in its stance on information 
regulation. While the ADA guidance is meant to encourage the free flow of 
information, the Title VII guidance is meant to circumscribe it. The results of 
our study confirm that employment discrimination guidance limiting the flow of 
information from employee to employer and vice versa is misdirected. Whether 
the subject of the information is family status, criminal history, or disability 
accommodation, underserved groups are best served when they can have open 
and honest conversations with their employers.131 In the absence of such 
 
129 Currently, there are five times as many stay-at-home mothers as stay-at-home fathers. Compare 
Livingston, supra note 24, at 1 (finding two million stay-at-home fathers in 2012), with COHN ET AL., supra 
note 19, at 6 (finding 10.4 million stay-at-home mothers in 2012). 
130  Procedures for Providing Reasonable Accommodation for Individuals with Disabilities, U.S. EQUAL 
EMP. OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/internal/reasonable_accommodation
.cfm [https://perma.cc/8MVG-TCFQ].  
131 See, e.g., Amanda Agan & Sonja Starr, Ban the Box, Criminal Records, and Statistical 
Discrimination: A Field Experiment 38 (Univ. of Mich. Law Sch., Law & Econ. Research Paper Series, 
Paper No. 16-012, 2016) (finding that ban-the-box policies harm employment prospects of African-American 
men because lack of information introduces statistical discrimination). 
88 University of Pennsylvania Law Review [Vol. 165: 49 
conversations, ambiguity aversion sets in for employers, thus limiting, and even 
undoing, the positive effects of employment discrimination laws. 
In proposing a transformation of the EEOC Title VII guidance from 
information-stifling to information-promoting, we do not mean to suggest 
that job applicants should begin listing their complete personal and family 
histories in résumés, applications, and cover letters. Advocates for employer 
credit-check bans and ban-the-box laws are concerned that employers will 
automatically throw out applications that check the wrong box or fail to meet 
a certain benchmark, without any further consideration.132 We, too, worry 
that a woman who advertises she is pregnant in her cover letter, or who lists 
the births of her six children on her résumé, will immediately see her 
application tossed by the employer without any further consideration.133 
What we advocate for is an increase in honest conversations at the interview 
stage. Instead of remaining shrouded in taboo and concerns about potential 
illegality, personal history and family matters should be something to talk 
about during the interview, something to deepen both the employer’s and the 
applicant’s understanding of each others’ wants and needs. 
Besides reducing the number of applicants who fall victim to employer ambiguity 
aversion, legal policy that promotes a deeper understanding between employers 
and applicants, we believe, will have two additional, positive repercussions in the 
workplace. First, such a policy should improve the quality of job matching 
between applicants and the positions for which they are hired. An extensive 
economics literature demonstrates that workers who are less satisfied with their 
 
132 See, e.g., Amy Traub, Discredited: How Employment Credit Checks Keep Qualified Workers Out of a 
Job, DĒMOS (2013), http://www.demos.org/sites/default/files/publications/Discredited-Demos.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3MYD-HCHX] (characterizing employer credit checks as an “illegitimate barrier to 
employment”); Ban the Box Campaign, LEGAL SERVICES FOR PRISONERS WITH CHILDREN (2016), 
http://www.prisonerswithchildren.org/our-projects/allofus-or-none/ban-the-box-campaign/ [https://p
erma.cc/RUV5-RASZ] (describing employment practices that ask about criminal history as “lifelong 
discrimination and exclusion because of a past arrest or conviction record”); Editorial, Millions Need 
Not Apply, N.Y. TIMES, May 30, 2011, at A18 (“Using a credit record as a key factor in hiring could 
marginalize millions of families and create a new, credit-record underclass.”); see also Kimani Paul-
Emile, Beyond Title VII: Rethinking Race, Ex-Offender Status, and Employment Discrimination in the 
Information Age, 100 VA. L. REV. 893, 951 (2014) (“The unfettered access to arrest and conviction data 
currently enjoyed by employers perpetuates bias, stigma, and discrimination against people with 
criminal records and widens racial disparities.”). 
133 In fact, we believe that this concern is precisely why it is so difficult to draw robust conclusions 
from résumé audit studies regarding the importance of information flow in the hiring process. Résumé 
audit studies can only reveal the effects of advertising personal and family information in a résumé, 
cover letter, or form application. Just because including this information on a résumé, cover letter, or 
form application may be harmful does not mean that bringing up such information will be harmful in 
an interview setting. For examples of résumé audit studies, see Bertrand & Mullainathan, supra note 98, 
at 994-97, which examine the differences in callback rates for résumé featuring white-sounding and 
African-American-sounding names, Pierné, supra note 102, at 3-8, which studies the impact that including 
certain national or religious affiliations has on hiring in the French real estate sector, and Rooth, supra 
note 104, at 716-21, which tests the impact of obesity and attractiveness on hiring outcomes. 
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jobs are more likely to quit.134 Similarly, employers and employees whose 
expectations are not aligned are more likely to part ways.135 Moreover, 
workplaces with more satisfied workers are more productive.136 The costs of 
employee turnover are high and include expenses related to the exiting 
employee, as well as expenses related to hiring a replacement employee.137 For 
workers, quitting or losing a job also imposes considerable turmoil, producing 
income instability and increasing employment search costs.138 Nonetheless, our 
proposed legal policy can diminish the incidence—and associated costs—of job 
mismatch. Increasing information flow between applicant and employer can let 
the employer know if the applicant’s personal issues and family life are 
compatible with the employer’s expectations before the employer invests too 
much time in a relationship doomed to fail. Similarly, promoting honest 
conversations can let the applicant know up front if the job requirements are 
likely to be compatible with his or her personal and family matters, which should 
 
134 See Joni Hersch, Education Match and Job Match, 73 REV. ECON. & STAT. 140, 141-44 (1991) 
(finding that overqualified workers in the U.S. are both less satisfied with their jobs and more likely 
to quit); Alfonso Sousa-Poza & Andrés A. Sousa-Poza, The Effect of Job Satisfaction on Labor Turnover 
by Gender: An Analysis for Switzerland, 36 J. SOCIO-ECON. 895, 908 (2007) (showing that reported 
job satisfaction predicts future quits). 
135 See generally W. Kip Viscusi, Employment Relationships with Joint Employer and Worker 
Experimentation, 24 INT’L ECON. REV. 313 (1983) (analyzing how the job matching process involves 
uncertainties on behalf of the worker and the employer that only get resolved over time, leading to 
turnover for unsuccessful matches); W. Kip Viscusi, Job Hazards and Worker Quit Rates: An Analysis 
of Adaptive Worker Behavior, 20 INT’L ECON. REV. 29 (1979) (showing that workers who learn their 
job is riskier than expected are more likely to quit). 
136 See, e.g., Petri Böckerman & Pekka Ilmakunnas, The Job Satisfaction-Productivity Nexus: A 
Study Using Matched Survey and Register Data, 65 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 244, 249-50 (2012) 
(demonstrating that within manufacturing plants, an increase in workplace satisfaction is associated 
with greater value added per hour). 
137 See DAVID G. ALLEN, SHRM FOUND., SOC’Y HUM. RES. MGMT., RETAINING TALENT: A 
GUIDE TO ANALYZING AND MANAGING EMPLOYEE TURNOVER 3 (2008), https://www.shrm.org/abo
ut/foundation/research/documents/retaining%20talent-%20final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2SVG-7HUC] 
(“Employee departures cost a company time, money, and other resources. Research suggests that direct 
replacement costs can reach as high as 50%-60% of an employee’s annual salary, with total costs associated 
with turnover ranging from 90% to 200% of annual salary.”); see also Kim E. Ruyle, President, Inventive 
Talent Consulting, LLC, SHRM Webcast, Measuring and Mitigating the Costs of Employee Turnover (July 17, 
2012), http://inventivetalent.com/pdf/Measuring%20and%20Mitigating%20the%20Cost%20of%20Emplo
yee%20Turnover%20with%20Notes.pdf [https://perma.cc/N36D-7UJU] (reporting that “[t]urnover costs 
are often estimated to be 100% – 300% of the base salary of [the] replaced employee (150% commonly cited),” 
after accounting for expenses such as severance pay, benefit continuation, and applicant search, hiring, and 
training). The actual cost of turnover differs widely by industry and level of employer. See, e.g., Heather 
Boushey & Sarah Jane Glynn, There Are Significant Business Costs to Replacing Employees, CTR. FOR AM. 
PROGRESS 2 (Nov. 16, 2012), https://cdn.americanprogress.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/11/16084443/Cost
ofTurnover0815.pdf [https://perma.cc/MXD2-GB32] (reviewing thirty case studies from eleven published 
articles, showing that reported turnover costs range from 5.8% to 213% of an employee’s annual salary). 
138 See generally Steven J. Davis & Till von Wachter, Recessions and the Costs of Job Loss, 2011 
BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 1 (showing that job displacement is associated with substantial 
lifetime earnings losses, anxiety, and search costs). 
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lead to a more informed decision about whether to accept a job and, in turn, to 
increased and more enduring job satisfaction. 
Second, and relatedly, we believe that the long-term effects of such a legal 
policy may improve conditions with respect to workplace flexibility. A 2014 
study by economic historian Claudia Goldin found that while a few industries, 
such as healthcare and technology, widely permitted employee flexibility in 
working hours and working location, many more traditional industries, 
including the corporate, legal, and financial sectors, lagged behind.139 Giving 
workers more control over the set of hours worked and the location from which 
they work, Goldin argues, is the necessary last step in eliminating the persistent 
pay gap between male and female workers.140 But increased flexibility need not 
benefit women at the expense of men; instead, she argues, such changes would 
benefit any worker, regardless of sex, who valued the flexibility to accommodate 
their personal and family lives.141 
Stifling honest conversations about personal and family matters, we 
suspect, does nothing to improve workplace flexibility. In fact, it may sustain 
and exacerbate the continued intransigence of certain industries to changes in 
employee working conditions by allowing employers to remain ignorant of 
what their workers require to accommodate their personal and family lives. 
Thus, removing personal issues and family matters from the category of 
unmentionables and instead making them something to talk about can do more 
than just improve outcomes for individual employers and employees; such a 
policy shift has the potential to spark systemic reforms in the workplace that 
are beneficial to all labor market participants, regardless of sex, criminal history, 
credit history, socioeconomic status, or minority status. 
 
139 See Claudia Goldin, A Grand Gender Convergence: Its Last Chapter, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 1091, 
1118 (2014) (“The rapidly growing sectors of the economy and newer industries and occupations, such 
as those in health and information technologies, appear to be moving in the direction of more flexibility 
and greater linearity of earnings with respect to time worked. The last chapter needs other sectors to 
follow their lead.”). 
140 See id. at 1092 (“The solution [to closing the gender gap] does not (necessarily) have to involve 
government intervention. It does not have to improve women’s bargaining skills and desire to compete. 
And it does not necessarily have to make men more responsible in the home (although that wouldn’t 
hurt). But it must involve alterations in the labor market, in particular changing how jobs are structured 
and remunerated to enhance temporal flexibility.”). 
141 See id. at 1118 (“What the last chapter must contain for gender equality is not a zero sum game in 
which women gain and men lose. This matter is not just a woman’s issue. Many workers will benefit from 
greater flexibility, although those who do not value the amenity will likely lose from its lower price.”). 
